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WE CAN FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE WITH THE
ARMY WE HAVE
MICHAEL A. QUIRKE*
Contrary to the conclusions of most environmental law schol-
ars and government officials, the regulation of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases (GHGs) by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and States through a National Secondary Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standard (Secondary NAAQS) under the Clean Air
Act (CAA) is feasible.  GHG reductions from this regulation over
the long-term, if coupled with in-kind reductions from other na-
tions, could protect public welfare from man-made climate change.
Establishing a long-range Secondary NAAQS for GHGs would be no
easy task and would take careful legal navigation by the EPA Admin-
istrator, leadership and commitment by the President, and nothing
short of a revolution in the rules on how EPA and state environ-
mental agencies enforce the Clean Air Act. Nevertheless, it could
be done.  This article shows how.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Congress passed the first version of the modern
CAA in 1970,1 the National Ambient Air Quality Standard provi-
sions (NAAQS program)2 have served as the Act’s “central con-
struct”3 and EPA’s “most comprehensive authority” to control air
pollution in the United States.4  Scholars have dubbed the core pro-
visions of the NAAQS program as the very “heart” of the CAA,5
1. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7616 (2012)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7410, 7470-7479, 7501-7515.
3. Linda Tsang & Alexandra Wyatt, Key Historical Court Decisions Shaping EPA’s
Program Under the Clean Air Act, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R43699, p.
1 (Feb. 16, 2017), http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43699.
4. Robert Nordhaus, New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 53, 59 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Patricia Ross McCubbin, EPA’s Endangerment Finding for Greenhouse
Gases and the Potential Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air Quality Standards to Address
Global Climate Change, 33 S.ILL.U. L.J. 437, 444 (2009); Christopher Giovinazzo,
3
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which is itself a vanguard environmental statute that Congress
passed during the inception of the “environmental decade” of the
1970s.6  Congress then enhanced and expanded the NAAQS pro-
gram, as with the statute as a whole, with the CAA Amendments of
1977 and 1990.7
While enforcement of Title II and Title IV has played a key
part in generally eliminating the threats of lead and dense smog in
urban areas and solving the problem of acid rain in the northeast,
respectively, the NAAQS program has enabled EPA and the States
to generally clean the nation’s air across the board.8  Granted,
many regions have failed to attain or maintain the NAAQS for
ozone, but EPA and the States have lowered dangerous concentra-
tions of every pollutant designated by Congress or listed by the EPA
Administrator for NAAQS regulation.9
Regarding the latter pathway to regulation, the NAAQS regula-
tion of a pollutant is triggered by the EPA Administrator simply list-
ing the gas as a “criteria pollutant” under the section 108.10
Greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4
or natural gas) seem to clearly meet the prerequisites for just such a
listing,11 but EPA has never attempted to list GHGs as a collective
criteria air pollutant.12  According to a vast majority of scholars, the
NAAQS program—the Act’s most comprehensive and in many ways
most powerful regulatory regime—could never work for GHGs and
is therefore not an option for fighting climate change.13
Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 163 (2006).
6. Lettie M. Wenner, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982); CLEAN
AIR ACT HANDBOOK xxi (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli eds., 3d 2011) [herein-
after CAA HANDBOOK].
7. See CAA Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95 95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977); CAA
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990); CAA HANDBOOK,
supra note 6, at xxi, 3.
8. See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 4, 25-38; see also Craig N. Oren, Is the
Clean Air Act at a Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1235-43 (2010).
9. See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 25-38; Nadja Popovich, America’s Skies
Have Gotten Clearer, But Millions Still Breathe Unhealthy Air, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 19,
2019), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/19/climate/us-air-pollution
-trump.html.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a).
11. See infra notes 44 and 46-47 and accompanying text.
12. See Robin Bravender, EPA Chief Signals Opposition to Clean Air Act Curbs on
GHGs, GREEN WIRE (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/
85407 (quoting Adm’r Lisa Jackson) (“I have never believed and this agency has
never believed that setting a [NAAQS] for greenhouse gases was advisable”).
13. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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“Fundamentally ill-suited to the task,” wrote the late Robert R.
Nordhaus,14 referring to the NAAQS program’s potential to control
outside concentrations of CO2, the most common and important of
all GHGs.15 And controlling outside concentrations of a pollutant is
precisely what Congress designed the NAAQS program to do.16
Other respected scholars across the policy spectrum have echoed
the same “ill-suited” refrain.17  As Professor Craig N. Oren writes in
a fairly recent paper, “EPA has not set NAAQS for greenhouse gases
because these gases are unsuitable for NAAQS.”18
Congress did, however, grant EPA a broad and powerful au-
thority to regulate air pollution to protect public health and welfare
when it passed and twice amended the CAA,19 and it specifically
extended the “public welfare” provision to include “effects on . . .
weather . . . and climate” in the last amendment in 1990.20  While
the exact boundary on EPA’s ultimate authority to regulate GHGs is
still an open question,21 EPA and the States have claimed and have
been exercising the authority to regulate GHGs to protect public
health and welfare from the dangers of climate change under vari-
ous parts of the CAA for approximately a decade.22
14. Nordhaus, supra note 4, at 61; cf. CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at xxi
(“the Act has evolved into a tool (the only tool) for achieving that which Congress
has not been able to accomplish for decades—the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions that cause climate change”).
15. See IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT, CONTRIBUTION
OF WORKING GROUPS I, II, AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 1-
10 (Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer, eds., 2014) [hereinafter
IPCC, 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5], htts://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/
2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf.
16. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7410 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air
Act: Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 284 (2010); Jonathan
Miller, Double Absurdity: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Under the Clean Air Act, 47 HOUS.
L. REV. 1389, 1404-05 (2011).
18. Craig N. Oren, UARG – Not a Chef D’Oeuvre of Opinion Writing, 39 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 52 (2015) (emphasis added).
19. See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 3 (“Congress has managed to over-
haul the CAA twice since 1970, more than doubling the size of the Act in the 1977
Amendments and doubling it again in the 1990 Amendments”); id. at xxi (“The
1977 and 1990 amendments to the Act expanded the statute’s breadth and scope
into the very fabric of our daily lives”); see also, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (holding that CAA bars consideration of economic costs
in setting NAAQ Standards).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2012).
21. See Michael Barbaro, A Conversation with Scott Pruitt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/podcasts/the-daily/scott-pruitt-epa.
html (former EPA Adm’r Scott Pruitt stating that “the jury is still out” at 13:52).
22. See, e.g., Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy Standards Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7,
2010) [hereinafter Tailpipe Rule]; Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regula-
5
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In the landmark 2007 decision of Massachusetts v. EPA, the Su-
preme Court held that CO2 and other GHGs such as methane
(CH4 or natural gas) are air pollutants under the CAA’s capacious
definition of the term.23  The Court further held that, because
GHGs are air pollutants, EPA had a non-discretionary duty to deter-
mine whether the gases pose a danger to public health and welfare
for purposes of regulation under the Title II,24 which regulates mo-
bile sources,25 or in lieu thereof demonstrate why such a determina-
tion could not be made.26  The Court also held that if EPA makes a
finding that the GHGs endanger public health or welfare, the CAA
requires EPA to regulate such emissions from mobile sources like
new motor vehicles.27  Court watchers and CAA scholars instantly
interpreted the decision as opening the door for future GHG regu-
lation under the CAA that would go far beyond that of cars and
trucks.28  As interconnected as it is ambitious, the CAA has many
near-mirrored provisions on endangerment.  Finding that a pollu-
tant endangers public health or welfare under one part of the CAA
usually triggers or at least sets the conditions for triggering a cascad-
ing effect of regulation under other parts of the Act.29
In late 2009, before the end of the first year of the administra-
tion of President Barack Obama, EPA made its determination on
GHGs in response to Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that GHGs in the
atmosphere endanger not only public welfare but also public health
and that emissions from motor vehicles cause or contribute to this
pollution.30  Approximately six months later, following some high-
level negotiations with automakers by President Obama, EPA
promulgated GHG emission standards for upcoming model years
tions That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs,
75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Triggering Rule].
23. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529, 532 (2007).
24. Id. at 532-34.
25. 42 U.S.C. Ch. 85, Subch. II, §§ 7521-7590.
26. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534 (“if the scientific uncertainty is so profound
that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment, it must say so”).
27. Id. at 533.
28. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful Gases,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/washington/
03scotus.html; see also, e.g., Duane Desidero, Climate Change Litigation Overview,
SN005, ALI-ABA 687, 692-3 (Aug. 2007).
29. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 17, at 288.
30. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496-537 (Dec. 15,
2009) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding].
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of cars and trucks set to take effect in 2012.31  And with that, the
regulation of carbon dioxide and other GHGs as pollutants under
the CAA officially began.32
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 2010, EPA promulgated its
“Triggering Rule,” ruling that once the new mobile source GHG
rule took effect in early 2011, the regulation of stationary sources
under the PSD and Title V programs of Title I would be triggered.33
Title I is the behemoth part of the Act that regulates stationary
sources34 and includes most substantive parts of the NAAQS pro-
gram,35 but the EPA Administrators under President Obama—first
Lisa Jackson and then Gina McCarthy—never attempted to list
GHGs as a collective criteria air pollutant,36 which would have re-
quired EPA to establish a NAAQS for the gases.
The conventional wisdom was, like it is now, that the NAAQS
program is “fundamentally ill-suited” for GHGs.37  Yet throughout
the first term of the Obama administration, following the Endan-
germent Finding, more than a few respected scholars were conclud-
ing that the CAA might actually compel the Administrator to list
GHGs as a collective criteria air pollutant and subsequently estab-
lish a NAAQS for the gases under Chevron step-one.38  Many of
those same scholars, however, were simultaneously warning that the
resulting regulation would be so unworkable as to jeopardize Presi-
31. See John Broder, Obama to Toughen Rules on Emissions and Mileage, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/business/19emis
sions.html.
32. Tailpipe Rule, supra note 22, at 25,324.
33. Triggering Rule, supra note 22, at 17,004; see also infra note 54 and accom-
panying text on PSD and Title V.
34. 42 U.S.C. Ch. 85, Subch. I, §§ 7401-515.
35. See id. §§ 7407-7410 (core NAAQS provisions).  Title I also encompasses
the major-source preconstruction permit programs known as “New Source Re-
view.” See infra Part II.
36. See Robin Bravender, EPA chief signals opposition to Clean Air Act curbs on
GHGs, GREEN WIRE (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/
85407 (quoting Adm’r Lisa Jackson) (“I have never believed and this agency has
never believed that setting a [NAAQS] for greenhouse gases was advisable”).
37. Compare, e.g., Nordhaus, supra note 4, at 61, with Zachary Hennessee, Res-
urrecting A Doctrine on Its Deathbed: Revisiting Federal Common Law Greenhouse Gas Liti-
gation After Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 67 DUKE L. J. 1073, 1100 (2018).
38. See, e.g, McCubbin, supra note 5, at 452 (citing Janine Maney, Carbon Diox-
ide Emissions, Climate Change, and the Clean Air Act: An Analysis of Whether Carbon
Dioxide Should Be Listed As a Criteria Pollutant, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL L. J. 298, 324-5
(2005); Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the
Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 830 & n. 167 (2008); Eric Schwartz, Carbon Dioxide and the
Clean Air Act, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS, 779, 813 (2006)); Richardson,
supra note 17, 284 (2010); see also infra Part X.A on the “Chevron two-step” analysis.
7
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dent Obama’s entire climate agenda.39  Accordingly, the Obama
EPA, otherwise proactive on GHG regulation, always did its best to
steer clear of the NAAQS provisions.40
In the approximate decade since the start of GHG regulation
under the CAA, there has been no action by EPA or litigation re-
garding a GHG NAAQS.41  If one starts exploring this issue by read-
ing environmental law articles from the mid-to-late 2000s42 or the
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) promulgated by
EPA late in the administration of President George W. Bush (Bush
43), one might find this lack of litigation curious.43
Now that EPA has made an endangerment finding and begun
regulating GHGs under the Act, scholars seem to all conclude that
the most common GHGs—carbon dioxide and methane—clearly
meet the two prerequisites for a criteria air pollutant listing at the
discretion of the EPA Administrator under section 108(a)(1).44  As
mentioned, this listing is the single administrative action that trig-
gers the entire NAAQS regulatory process for a pollutant.45  Regard-
39. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 17, at 284; McCubbin, supra note 5 at 453;
see also Inimai M. Chettiar & Jason A. Schwartz, The Road Ahead: EPA’s Options and
Obligations for Regulating Greenhouse Gases, N.Y.U. INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, Rep.
No. 3, 144-45 n. 282 (2009). “Most industry analysts argue EPA has no discretion
on listing [GHGs as a criteria air pollutant], presumably because they want to
demonstrate the horrible consequences of using the Clean Air Act to regulate
greenhouse gases . . . Independent academic analysts are split.” Id.
40. See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 521.
41. See infra Part VII.A.
42. See, e.g., McCubbin, supra note 5, at 439; Richardson, supra note 17, at 286.
43. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73
Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,498 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter referred to as the “Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” or “ANPR”].  The ANPR comprises an in-depth
analysis on the feasibility of GHG regulation under the CAA made by EPA staff and
is interspersed with calls for comments. Much of the analysis by EPA staff is de-
voted to the NAAQS program, and their conclusions alarmed the Bush 43 cabinet,
to include the EPA Administrator himself. See id. at 44,355 (preface from EPA
Adm’r Johnson); id. at 44,355-60 (letter from the Secs. of Agriculture, Commerce,
Transportation, & Energy to Adm’r Susan Dudley); id. at 44,376 (letter and analy-
sis of ANPR draft by the Dept. of Commerce).
44. See, e.g., Chettiar & Schwartz, supra note 39, at 35 (“[of] course, EPA can
voluntarily undertake an endangerment finding for any greenhouse gas under Sec-
tion 108”); see also, e.g, Howard Crystal & Kassie Siegel et al., Returning to Clean Air
Act Fundamentals: A Renewed Call to Regulate Greenhouse Gases Under the National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) Program, 31 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. REV.
233, 240 (2019) (concluding that GHGs “indisputably” fit the two prerequisites,
considering that they derive from numerous and diverse sources and that “EPA has
already made—and successfully defended—an ‘endangerment finding’” under Ti-
tle II).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2012) (titled “air quality criteria and control
techniques” and covering the listing); id. § 7408(a)(2) (requiring issuance of “cri-
teria” that reflect latest scientific knowledge on the pollutant’s “identifiable effects
on public health or welfare” within twelve months of listing); id. § 7408(b) (requir-
8
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ing the first requirement, no other pollutant regulated under the
CAA derives from more “numerous or diverse”46 sources than CO2.
As for methane, the number and diversity of sources are signifi-
cantly less than those of CO2 but still immense.47  Regarding the
second prerequisite, EPA already determined in its 2009 Endanger-
ment Finding that GHG emissions from cars and trucks pose a dan-
ger to public welfare and health by causing global warming.48  A
similar endangerment finding within a criteria air pollutant listing
for GHGs under section 108(a)(1)(A),49 which would be subse-
quently supported by the issuance of “criteria” documents within 12
months,50 would require no leap in logic or new science to refer-
ence.  The issue of a GHG NAAQS, however, has never been about
whether the gases meet the prerequisites for a criteria air pollutant
listing at the discretion of the EPA Administrator.  Rather, the issue
has always been about what would happen after such a listing is
made
In short, scholars cannot figure out how a GHG could work or,
put more precisely, work in a way that protects public welfare or
health from climate change51 without devastating the U.S. econ-
omy.52  Additionally, leading up to the 2014 Supreme Court deci-
ing issuance of information on “control techniques” that reduce emissions simulta-
neously with issuance of criteria); id. § 7409(a)(2) (requiring Administrator to
publish—with issuance of criteria—a proposed NAAQS within twelve months of
listing).
46. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(B).
47. See, e.g., EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2017, EPA 430-R-19-001, ES-28 fig ES-17 (2019) http://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2019-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf (last
visited July 15, 2019).
48. See Endangerment Finding supra note 30.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
50. See supra note 45.
51. See, e.g., Nordhaus, supra note 4, at 63 (“[C]riteria air pollutant regulation
under CAA is incapable of controlling CO2 concentrations and does not provide a
workable framework on which to erect a domestic climate policy”).
52. See, e.g., Peter Glaser, Avoiding a Regulatory Nightmare, 26 THE ENVTL FO-
RUM, Issue 2, 52-53 (March/April 2009). “Any regulation of GHGs under the CAA
will likely trigger rigid, hugely expensive command-and-control regulation of small
emission sources of all types throughout the nation . . . while yielding no meaning-
ful environmental benefit . . . . Even worse, regulation of GHGs could trigger a
requirement for the establishment of [NAAQSs] under the CAA . . . . [W]e face
the truly frightening prospect that the entire country will be declared to be a car-
bon dioxide nonattainment area . . . . It is difficult to comprehend how there
could be meaningful economic growth in such a regulatory environment.” Id.; cf.
Marlo Lewis, CO2 Regulation under the Clean Air Act: Economic Train Wreck, Constitu-
tional Crisis, Legislative Thuggery, Master Resource, A FREE-MARKET ENERGY BLOG (Mar.
19, 2009), http://www.masterresource.org/business-strategy-and-messaging/co2-
regulation-under-the-clean-air-act-economic-train-wreck-constitutional-crisis-legisla-
tive-thuggery/. “[M]ajor sources would have to “offset” any emissions increase
9
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sion in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA53 (UARG), attorneys for
the Obama EPA argued that the Agency could not possibly regulate
sources of GHGs according to the text of the Act’s Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V programs54—which
EPA would be obligated to do under a GHG NAAQS regime—with-
out causing “absurd results.”55
A. The Two Major Issues with the Potential Regulation of
Greenhouse Gases Through a National Ambient Air
Quality Standard
Overall, scholars have identified two major issues with the po-
tential NAAQS regulation of GHGs.  The first issue, called the de-
sign problem, arises when one applies the NAAQS scheme to a gas
like CO2.56  The crux of the matter is that along with being a natu-
rally ubiquitous trace gas, a fundamental component of the earth’s
carbon cycle, and the primary byproduct of burning fossil fuels,
CO2 is an extraordinarily long-lived gas.57  Once emitted, a mole-
cule of CO2 usually disperses into the atmosphere and often stays
in the atmosphere for a long time, resulting in annual CO2 concen-
trations in the outside air that are generally uniform throughout
the world.58  As the human population grows and the global econ-
omy expands, ambient CO2 concentrations will continue their in-
exorable march upward in the coming decades.59  Consequently, a
from a new or modified source by reducing emissions from an existing source
somewhere else. Roughly speaking, nothing could be built or expanded anywhere
in the United States unless something else shuts down—a de-facto moratorium on
growth.” Id.
53. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
54. 42 U.S.C §§ 7470-7492 (PSD Program); id. §§ 7661-7661(f) (Title V pro-
gram); see infra Part II.
55. See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 22, UARG, Nos. 12-1146, 12-1248,
12-1254, 12-1268, 12-1269, 12-1272, 2014 WL 251995 *22 (2014).
56. See generally Arnold Reitze, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT 417 (2001).
57. See, e.g., David Archer, Fate of Fossil Fuel CO2 in Geologic Time, 110 J. GE-
OPHYS. RES., C09S05, 1, 5 (2005).
58. Id.; see also generally The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index, Nat.
Oceanic & Atmos. Adm., http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/aggi/aggi.html (last vis-
ited July 21, 2019).
59. See IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 11 fig. SPM.4 (Ottmar
Edenhofer, Ramon Pichs-Madruga, Youba Sokona et al., eds., 2014) [hereinafter
IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AR5], http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/
wg3/ (figure SPM.4 is in the summary for policymakers at the beginning); see also
IPCC, 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5, supra note 15, at 8-9 SPM 2.1; Malte Mein-
shausen et al., The RCP Greenhouse Gas Concentrations and their Extension from 1765 to
10
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state or single nation is unable to reduce the average annual ambi-
ent CO2 concentration within its borders in a few years or many
years merely by its own effort.60  Reducing concentrations of a pol-
lutant in the ambient air is what Congress precisely intended when
designing the NAAQS program, so many scholars conclude that this
design issue, with its need of international collaboration, would be
a fatal flaw to any proposed GHG NAAQS.61
The second problem, called the thresholds problem, concerns
the Act’s tons-per-year (“tpy”) emission thresholds62 for the permit-
ting regulation of stationary sources under the CAA.  If a stationary
source potentially emits “any air pollutant” in excess of these an-
nual thresholds under the Act, it triggers preconstruction-permit
regulation for that source under either Part C of the Act (“the PSD
program”)63 or Part D (Nonattainment New Source Review
(“NNSR”)64—both are collectively referred to as “New Source Re-
view” (“NSR”)—as well as operating-permit regulation under Title
V.65  The thresholds for PSD are 250 tons-per-year or, for certain
enumerated categories of sources, 100 tpy.66  For Title V, the
threshold is always 100 tpy.67  The NSR and Title V programs com-
prise fundamental parts of the NAAQS regulation of criteria air pol-
lutants, though EPA has long used PSD and Title V to regulate non-
criteria air pollutants as well.68
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in UARG,69 au-
thored by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, EPA had long interpreted
the term “any air pollutant” to mean any regulated air pollutant.70
2300, 109 CLIMATE CHANGE 213, 213-241 (2011), http://link.springer.com/con
tent/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10584-011-0156-z.pdf (last visited July 6, 2019) (covering
concentrations beyond 2100).
60. See Reitze, supra note 56, at 417.
61. See supra notes 14, 17, and 18 and accompanying text.
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(1), 7661(2)(B), 7602(j) (2012).
63. Id. §§ 7470-7492 (PSD applies to regions in attainment of NAAQS or
deemed “unclassifiable”).
64. Id. §§ 7501-7515 (NNSR applies to regions in nonattainment of NAAQS).
65. Id. §§ 7661-7661(f).
66. Id. § 7479(1).
67. Id. §§ 7661(2)(B), 7602(j); see also UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310
(2014).
68. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 316 (“Since 1978, EPA’s regulations have inter-
preted ‘air pollutant’ in the PSD permitting trigger as limited to regulated air pol-
lutants, 43 Fed. Reg. 26403 (1978), codified, as amended, 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(b)(1)(-(2), (50) (2012).”).
69. Id. at 302.
70. See UARG, supra note 67, at 316, citing Requirements for Preparation,
Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air
Quality Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg. 26, 380, 26, 382 (June 19, 1978).
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Once the Obama EPA began regulating GHGs under Title II, EPA
officials and many scholars therefore presumed that the term “any
air pollutant” must include GHGs, and that EPA was therefore obli-
gated to enforce PSD and Title V on stationary sources of GHGs.71
EPA officials believed this outcome was mandated by the Act’s clear
language under Chevron step-one.72 EPA officials also concluded,
however, that it could not possibly regulate GHGs under PSD and
Title V in accordance with the Act’s thresholds at that time without
causing “absurd results.”73  And if the 250 and 100 tpy thresholds
were to suddenly apply to stationary sources of GHGs without signifi-
cant changes in the rules, it would indeed cause a huge problem.
The inconvenient truth is that our current economy is still very
much reliant on the burning of fossil fuels for cheap and abundant
energy.  While many of the other air pollutants regulated by the
CAA comprise impurities from the burning of fossil fuels or result
from inefficient combustion, CO2 primarily comprises “the emis-
sion stream itself.”74  Thus, by way of physics and economic reality,
a myriad of sources large and small emit CO2 in amounts that are
“orders of magnitude”75 greater than those of other pollutants.  In
the U.S., hundreds of thousands of currently unregulated stationary
sources—large office buildings, small manufacturers, apartment
complexes, individual oil rigs, hospitals, schools, big churches, and
even some mansions—potentially emit and often do emit over 250
tons of CO2 or CO2eq76 on an annual basis.77  Knowing this, for
years many scholars and officials anticipated, not without some fear,
that once GHGs became regulated as air pollutants, there would be
71. See McCubbin, supra note 5, at 451-53; Richardson, supra note 17, at 284;
see also Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 55, at 22; Chettiar &
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 144-45 n. 282.
72. See Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 55, at 22; see also infra
Part X.A on the “Chevron two-step” established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
73. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 55, at 22.
74. Miller, supra note 17, at 1403; see also Reitze supra note 56, at 411 (“even
ideal combustion . . . produces only CO2 and water vapor”).
75. ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,498 (July 30, 2008).
76. See IPCC, 2014: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, An IPCC Special Report on
the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related
Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, Annex I, 542 (glossary) (Masson-Delmotte &
Zhai et al., eds., 2018) [hereinafter IPCC, 2014: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C], http:/
/www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ (defining CO2eq). Scientists often measure GHGs in CO2eq
or “carbon dioxide equivalent” form by taking the global annual ambient means of
CH4 and other GHGs and their respective “radiative (heat) forcing” effects and
atmospheric life spans and combining them with those of global CO2 to arrive at a
uniform measurement. Id.
77. ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,498-44,499, cited by UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302,
310 (2014).
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a massive expansion in the number of sources in need of a PSD and
Title V permit for their CO2 and CH4 emissions, whether or not
GHGs were ever listed as a collective criteria air pollutant.78
Once EPA began regulating GHGs under the CAA, the Agency
therefore found itself stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard
place with regard to PSD and Title V.  To get out of this bind, yet
still achieve President Obama’s goal of establishing PSD and Title V
regulation for the “largest sources of GHG emissions,”79 EPA
promulgated the “Tailoring Rule.”80  Through this rule, EPA first
established PSD and Title V regulation for GHG sources already reg-
ulated by those programs,81 on account of their non-GHG emis-
sions—dubbed “anyway sources” because they were being regulated
by PSD and Title V anyway.82  To contain the fallout, EPA then tried
to replace the troublesome 250 and 100 tpy thresholds in the Act’s
text with drastically higher numbers for GHGs.83  EPA argued that
it would have to regulate stationary sources of GHGs at these “tai-
lored” levels at least initially, though perhaps indefinitely, to avoid
“absurd results.”84
This attempted edit of the Clean Air Act garnered a “splenetic”
rebuke by Justice Scalia in UARG.85  Writing for a majority of the
Court, Justice Scalia vacated the “tailoring” part of the Tailoring
Rule, but not before giving EPA a memorable lesson on the separa-
tion of powers:
Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in the
Tailoring Rule, we would deal a severe blow to the Consti-
tution’s separation of powers. Under our system of govern-
ment, Congress makes laws and the President, acting at
78. See, e.g., ANPR Preface from EPA Adm’r Johnson, supra note 43, at 44,355;
John-Mark Stensvaag, Preventing Significant Deterioration Under the Clean Air Act: New
Facility Permit Triggers, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10003, 10010 (2008);
Richard J. Lazarus, The Opinion Assignment Power, Justice Scalia’s Un-Becoming, and
UARG’s Unanticipated Cloud over the Clean Air Act, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 44
(2015).
79. CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 521.
80. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tai-
loring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,292 (Oct. 27, 2009), finalized Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514
(June 3, 2010) [finalized version hereinafter referred to as “Tailoring Rule”].
81. Id. at 31,541 (describing “anyway source” regulation as “Step One”).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 31,567 (attempting to “tailor” thresholds from 100/250 tpy to
75,000/100,000 tpy CO2eq under “Step 2”).
84. See id.; see also Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 55, at 22.
85. William W. Buzbee, Anti-Regulatory Skewing and Political Choice in UARG, 39
HARV. EVNTL. L. REV. 63, 67 (2015).
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times through agencies like EPA, “faithfully execute[s]”
them. U. S. Const., Art. II, §3; see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.
S. 491, 526–527 (2008). The power of executing the laws
necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to
resolve some questions left open by Congress that arise
during the law’s administration. But it does not include a
power to revise clear statutory terms [. . .]86
And, as Justice Scalia noted earlier in the opinion:
It is hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous than
the precise numerical thresholds at which the Act requires
PSD and Title V permitting. When EPA replaced those
numbers with others of its own choosing, it went well be-
yond the bounds of its statutory authority.87
But instead of forcing EPA to enforce PSD and Title V on GHG
sources in accordance with the thresholds written by Congress, the
Court found that EPA was not compelled down this path, because a
narrower construction of the term “any air pollutant” was availa-
ble.88  Nor could EPA treat GHGs as “any air pollutant” by its own
discretion, the Court seemingly held, if the resulting regulation
would render the PSD and Title V programs “unadministrable and
‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ them.”89
The Court did not adopt a particular construction of the term
“any air pollutant” but did offer two possibilities in a footnote, while
stipulating that “[w]e do not foreclose EPA or the courts from con-
sidering [these] constructions in the future.”90  The Court first of-
fered that the term “any air pollutant” could possibly mean any
“NAAQS pollutant[ ]” (in other words, any criteria air pollutant)
and, for support, cited the D.C. Circuit dissent of then-Judge Brett
Kavanaugh.91  Or perhaps the term could be limited to those pollu-
tants with “localized effects,” the Court offered, referencing an ar-
gument appearing in some of the states’ pleadings and in a few
86. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014).
87. Id. at 326 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
88. Id. at 320 n. 6.
89. Id. at 312, quoting Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31,562; see also Buzbee,
supra note 85, at 76.
90. UARG, 573 U.S. at 320 n. 6.
91. Id., citing Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012
WL 6621785, at *13, *14-18 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from denials of rehearing en banc).
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amicus briefs by industry groups.92  As Professor Craig Oren notes,
the “localized effects” construction is weak, lacks textual support,
and was not persuasive to the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.93  Fur-
thermore, as Part II of this paper will explain, contextual arguments
in its favor could be soundly rebutted with a well-designed Secon-
dary GHG NAAQS scheme.94  However, the construction of then-
Judge Kavanaugh (now-Justice Kavanaugh) that “any air pollutant”
could be limited to the “NAAQS pollutants” is viable and could pos-
sibly be relied upon.95  That is, there is seemingly no narrower of a
construction of the term “any air pollutant” that excludes criteria
air pollutants.
Curiously, in Part II-B-2 of the UARG opinion, with a different
majority of Justices joining Justice Scalia, the Court nevertheless al-
lowed EPA to proceed with its GHG regulation of “anyway sources”
under PSD and Title V,96 which enabled EPA to achieve roughly the
same regulatory scope that President Obama was hoping for.  That
is, the largest sources of GHGs, which were being regulated by PSD
and Title V because of their non-GHG emissions anyway, became
subject to PSD’s “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) re-
quirement and Title V with regard to their GHG emissions.97  Pro-
fessor Richard Lazarus notes that this “compromise position” was
very “un-Scalia-like.”98
As an avowed “textualist,” Justice Scalia always shunned the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation because it enables
justices and jurists to “choos[e] which legislative history materials to
use . . . like arriving at a party and picking out one’s friends in the
92. UARG, 573 U.S. at 320 n. 6, seemingly citing Coal. for Resp. Regulation, 684
F.3d 102, 136-38 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Coal. for Responsible Reg. Timing & Tai-
loring Br. 35-36, 38 (brief by industry group)).
93. See Oren, supra note 8, at 55 (“[It] . . . is too much the argument rejected
in Massachusetts”), citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 and 529 n. 26 (2007).
94. For a more detailed analysis, see infra notes 174-231 and accompanying
text.
95. See Coal. for Resp. Regulation (Kanvaugh, J., dissenting), supra note 91 at
*14-18.
96. UARG, 573 U.S. at 331-34.  In Part II-B-2, Justice Scalia lost Justices
Thomas and Alito but gained the support of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in full.
Justices Thomas and Alito joined in Parts I, II-A, and II-B-2, and Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined in Part II-B-2.  Justice Breyer filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Alito filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, with Justice Thomas joining him. Id.
97. See id. at 315; see also Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31, 568 (“we esti-
mate that ‘anyway’ sources account for approximately sixty-five percent of total
national stationary source GHG emissions”).
98. Lazarus, supra note 78, at 44.
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crowd”99 to achieve their own preferred policy outcomes.  Professor
William Buzbee, a critic of the UARG opinion, charges that Justice
Scalia effectively did the same thing with the CAA’s text and the
administrative record by picking out a few statutory provisions, mak-
ing assumptions on their “implementation burdens” based on cur-
rent rules,100 citing a few estimations from the Bush 43 EPA and
even an old memorandum from the Clinton EPA,101 and ignoring
much of the rest of the Act’s text to arrive at his own preferred
policy outcome.102  Nevertheless, the Court allowed EPA to proceed
with its regulation of “anyway sources” of GHGs, which led many
environmentalists to declare victory,103 though many scholars advo-
cating for action on climate change under the CAA bemoan the
decision for all of its anti-regulatory dicta, of which there is a
plenty.104
In summary, while some scholars read UARG as prohibiting
EPA from pursuing any regulatory path that treats GHGs as “any air
pollutant” and applies the NSR and Title V thresholds to GHG
sources,105 I read the decision as only prohibiting EPA from regu-
lating GHG sources in accordance with the Act’s thresholds solely
on the basis of GHGs becoming regulated pollutants.106  The UARG
99. Buzbee, supra note 85, at 67 (citing Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997) (crediting Judge Harold
Leventhal for the metaphor)).
100. Id. at 76 (“the actual textual basis for the majority’s rejection of EPA
power is merely an inference drawn from implementation burdens”), citing UARG,
573 U.S. at 317-18.
101. Id. at 317.
102. Buzbee, supra note 85, at 74; see also Oren, supra note 8, at 1245.
103. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Emission Limits on Big Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justices-with-lim-
its-let-epa-curb-power-plant-gases.html.
104. See Buzbee, supra note 85, at 64 (“unnecessary comments about the CAA
and EPA power all cut in the direction of less regulation of GHGs”); Oren, supra
note 19, at 51 (“The decision . . . includes dicta that disregard the words of the
statute”).
105. See Buzbee, supra note 85, at 72 (“[the UARG] majority . . . finds implicit
in substantial implementation burdens that the PSD program could not possibly
encompass regulation of sources due only to their GHG emissions”); see also, e.g.,
Hennessee, supra note 37, at 1100. “It is unlikely that Sections 108 and 109 could
be interpreted to address [GHGs], as doing so would yield the same untenably
high administrative costs and regulatory burdens that the Court recoiled from in
UARG. For one, designating [GHGs] as criteria pollutants would cause PSD and
Title V requirements to apply to the same small sources that UARG already found
could not be regulated under those programs . . . [Such regulation] could result in
crushing costs on states and industry to come into compliance with whatever stan-
dard is chosen by the EPA.” Id.
106. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 332 (2014) (stating that the holding is
“narrow” and limited to a “distinct context”).
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holding, I argue, does not preclude a GHG NAAQS, because by
possibly relying on then-Judge Kavanaugh’s construction that the
term “any air pollutant” does not include GHGs because GHGs are
not criteria air pollutants,107 the Court implicitly leaves open
whether EPA could regulate GHGs through a NAAQS.  Should the
EPA Administrator list GHGs as a collective criteria air pollutant
and begin establishing a NAAQS for the gases, the issue regarding
the PSD and Title V thresholds and GHGs would once again come
before the Court—just in a different way.
Such GHG NAAQS regulation, however, would not stand a
chance of being upheld if it would render PSD and Title V
“unadministrable and ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that de-
signed’ them”108 or prevent U.S. economic growth.109  But this pa-
per’s proposed scheme avoids these outcomes.  This paper will
cover the decision in UARG in depth in Parts V, X.B, and XI, but
summarily, the Court found a way for EPA to avoid creating a
mountain of a regulatory task that, according to the Agency, it
could not possibly surmount.110  The Court accomplished this by
narrowly construing the term “any air pollutant” to exclude GHGs.
However, because there is no textual support for a construction
that excludes NAAQS-regulated pollutants,111 the Court would
likely be unable to afford EPA a similar escape route if the EPA
Administrator were to list GHGs as a collective criteria air pollutant,
as NSR and Title V comprise fundamental parts of the NAAQS reg-
ulatory scheme.112  In sum, the Court’s holding in UARG does not
seem to foreclose the possibility of a future NAAQS for GHGs if a
GHG NAAQS regime could work as Congress designed and enable
U.S. economic growth.113  Though if one conflates all the Court’s
dicta with its holding in UARG, one cannot help but to conclude
that the NAAQS program is simply not an option for regulating
GHGs and fighting climate change.114
107. See id. at 320 n. 6.
108. Id. at 312.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2012) (declaring that one of the purposes of
PSD program is “to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent
with the preservation of existing clean air resources”); see also Hennessee, supra
note 37, at 1100; Glaser, supra note 52, at 52-53; Marlo supra note 52.
110. UARG, 573 U.S. at 320.
111. See id. at 320 n. 6.
112. See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 137.
113. UARG, 573 U.S. at 320.
114. See supra notes 110 and 111; Envtl. Prot. Agency, Fact Sheet: New Source
Review (NSR), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/
nsrbasicsfactsheet103106.pdf.
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In essence, EPA and States have never had to enforce the PSD
preconstruction-permit provisions and Title V operating-permit
provisions on relatively small sources, because the vast majority of
sources emitting non-GHG pollutants in excess of the PSD and Ti-
tle V thresholds have always been large industrial facilities.115  Such
large facilities, according to some gratuitous dictum courtesy of Jus-
tice Scalia, are “capable of shouldering [the] heavy substantive and
procedural burdens” imposed by these programs.116
Enforcement of PSD and Title V by EPA and state environmen-
tal agencies does indeed impose “heavy substantive and procedural
burdens” on regulated entities as the rules are currently written and
applied.  But President Obama’s Solicitor General Don Verrilli only
briefly “conjecture[d]” that EPA could maybe alleviate these bur-
dens through rulemaking, which Justice Scalia found insufficient
and unconvincing.117
In fact, the extremely long delays and frightening levels of reg-
ulatory backlog that EPA estimated would result from GHG regula-
tion at the thresholds were all based on current rules, practices, and
regulatory procedures at EPA and state environmental agencies.118
EPA thus gave little effort in offering ways to mitigate these delays
and backlog.  Instead, the Agency provided the rather inflated esti-
mates as a means to justify its “tailoring” of the CAA.119  Presented
with such frightening estimations, Justice Scalia concluded that if
EPA were to suddenly enforce PSD on tens of thousands of rela-
tively small sources and require a Title V permit from a few million
more, the regulatory backlog would “caus[e] construction projects
to grind to a halt nationwide.”120
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rightfully castigated EPA
for indirectly claiming an immense regulatory authority on one
hand and arbitrarily “tailoring” that authority through a statutory
re-write on the other.121  But after EPA presented him with a
parade of horribles regarding GHG regulation at the thresholds,
the late Justice could not refrain from dispensing plenty of dicta on
what he thought about such hypothetical regulation, espoused after
a “brief review” of some of the Act’s text by an avowed textualist no
115. See Miller, supra note 17, at 1403.
116. UARG, 573 U.S. at 322.
117. See id. at 324 n. 7.
118. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31, 537-541, 540.
119. See id. at 31, 557.
120. UARG, 573 U.S. at 322.
121. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31, 567.
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less.122  Ignoring statutory text on the purposes and ambition of the
CAA and provisions that seemingly deny EPA discretion regarding
the protection of public health and/or welfare, Justice Scalia took
the “absurd results” that EPA warned of at face value and surmised
that there is:
[N]o doubt that the [Act’s permitting programs] are de-
signed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended be-
yond, a relative handful of large sources capable of
shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.123
This is dictum and not precedent, but it is clear dictum no less,
and herein lies the crux of the thresholds problem.  Scholars have
yet to articulate a way to solve, much less mitigate, the thresholds
problem clarified by UARG.  Perhaps this is because they find the
design problem so intractable.
Both the design and thresholds problems underscore the sheer
challenge of mitigating man-made global warming and ocean acidi-
fication (collectively referred as “climate change” herein) by reduc-
ing CO2 and other GHG emissions across the nation and across the
world this century.  In the present U.S. economy and throughout a
majority of the rest of the world, humans move goods and people
around in cars and trucks that burn gasoline or diesel fuel in inter-
nal-combustion-engines; we fly across the world in jets that burn
highly refined petroleum; we warm our homes and buildings with
heaters and often cook our food in stoves that burn methane; we
transport cargo across the ocean in ships that burn diesel fuel; and
we make steel and cement through processes that burn heavy hy-
drocarbons such as coke and coal at high temperatures in large
vats.124  Most consequential of all, we keep our lights on, run our air
conditioning and electronics, and manufacture things with grid
power that mostly derives from power plants burning coal or natu-
ral gas for energy.125
Nevertheless, I argue that the design problem can be solved
and the thresholds could be, if not entirely solved, at least mitigated
and effectively managed.  In other words, this nation, under cur-
122. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 322.
123. Id.
124. See Dept. of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Outlook
2016, DOE/EIA-0484, 141 fig. 9-2 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/
0484(2016).pdf; Dept. of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., Monthly Energy Review
June 2019, DOE/EIA-0484, 204 fig. 12.2 (2019), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/
data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf (showing U.S. emissions).
125. See id. at 123 fig. 7.2.
19
Quirke: We Can Fight Climate Change with the Army We Have
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
20 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31: p. 1
rent law, could be put on a bold climate mitigation policy.  But be
forewarned: this is a path “not for the weak or faint-hearted.”126
B. Solving the Design Problem with a Long-range Secondary
NAAQS for GHGs and Managing the Thresholds
Problem with New Rules
In short, the design problem can be solved, because EPA can
establish a long-range Secondary NAAQS for GHGs.  Essentially,
States can indeed develop and implement plans that, “but for emis-
sions emanating from outside of the United States”127 would
achieve an ambitious Secondary NAAQS128 for GHGs as long as the
attainment date for the standard is set in the far distant future.129
As for solving or at least effectively mitigating the thresholds prob-
lem, EPA and state agencies can make changes to the rules gov-
erning the enforcement of the Act’s permitting provisions.  With
dramatic changes, they could drastically alleviate the regulatory bur-
den placed on newly regulated sources and regulators alike.130
Managing and mitigating the thresholds problem in this fashion
would attack the assumption made by Justice Scalia that the regula-
tory burden of PSD and Title V cannot be alleviated but not the
principle, espoused in dictum, that the burden is currently too heavy
to enable PSD and Title V regulation of GHG sources at the 100
and 250 tpy thresholds.131
With regard to solving the design problem, what the vast ma-
jority of scholars do not seem to realize is that the NAAQS scheme
can start working as designed for GHGs if one simply uses a Secon-
dary NAAQS and applies it to a timeline relevant to climate, climate
change, and the inevitable rise and hopeful fall of CO2 in the atmos-
phere over the next few centuries:132
126. U.S. Army, RANGER HANDBOOK, SH 21-76 (2006).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(a) (2012).
128. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
129. See id. § 7502(a)(2)(B) (requiring Secondary NAAQS to be attained “as
expeditiously as possible”); see also id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii) (permitting attainment
status of “unclassifiable” for “any area that cannot be classified on the basis of
available information as meeting or not meeting the national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard for the pollutant”); see also infra Parts IV and IX.A.
130. See infra Parts V and XIII.
131. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014).
132. See IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AR5, supra note 59, at 11
fig. SPM.4; Meinshausen et al., supra note 59, at 213-41 (analyzing projected GHG
concentrations beyond year 2100).
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133
This timeline is extremely long-term, which is perhaps one rea-
son why others have not proposed it. The general concept of a
long-range Secondary GHG NAAQS, however, is not novel.  In fact,
the potential feasibility of the concept was recognized by EPA staff
133. Id.; supra note 59, at 232 fig. 5; see IPCC, 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5,
supra note 15, at 8-9 SPM 2.1 (explaining “Representative Concentration Pathways
(RCPs)” and that RCP 2.6 comprises the “stringent mitigation scenario [which]
aims to keep global warming likely below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures,”
and that “scenarios without additional efforts to constrain emissions [. . .] lead to
pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5.”).
21
Quirke: We Can Fight Climate Change with the Army We Have
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
22 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31: p. 1
in the ANPR,134 which the Bush 43 EPA promulgated as an initial
response to Massachusetts v. EPA.
In the ANPR, EPA attorneys analyzed how the regulation of
GHGs could potentially work under the various CAA programs and
called for comments.  In the ANPR’s preface, EPA Administrator
Stephen L. Johnson reiterated the losing argument in Massachusetts
v. EPA that the CAA was never designed to regulate GHGs, and he
warned of an “unprecedented expansion of EPA authority that
would have a profound effect on virtually every sector of the econ-
omy and touch every household in the land.”135  The ANPR itself,
however, was written by EPA staff and seemed to “suggest[ ] that
the Clean Air Act can be both workable and effective for addressing
global climate change.”136  In the ANPR’s evaluation of a scenario
wherein EPA establishes a Secondary GHG NAAQS and every re-
gion in the country is in attainment or is unclassifiable, EPA attor-
neys actually wrote that the NAAQS program “potentially could
provide authority for a nationwide cap-and-trade program imple-
mented at the state level.”137  This proclamation shocked the Bush
43 cabinet.138  Referencing letters from the Secretaries of Energy,
134. Compare ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. 44, 354, 44, 481 (July 30, 2008) (treatment
of Primary NAAQS) (“[i]t would appear to be an inescapable conclusion that the
maximum 10 year horizon for attaining the primary NAAQS is ill-suited to pollu-
tants such as greenhouse gases with long atmospheric residence times”), with id. at
44, 478, 44, 481-82 (treatment of Secondary NAAQS). “[The] direct effects of
GHG emissions appear to be principally or exclusively welfare related . . . This
raises the question whether it is more appropriate to address [the] health effects as
part of our consideration of the welfare effects of GHGs when setting a secondary
NAAQS rather than a primary NAAQS . . . Under a secondary [NAAQS] standard,
state plans must achieve attainment as expeditiously as practicable, but there is no
statutory maximum date . . . EPA requests comment on the concept of implement-
ing a GHG secondary NAAQS standard in a way roughly analogous to an approach
used in the long-term regional visibility program [which] requires states to develop
reasonable progress goals every 10 years [and] ultimately achiev[e] the 2064 natu-
ral condition goal . . . The regional haze program’s model . . . could offer a possi-
ble framework for achieving a GHG secondary NAAQS.” Id.
135. Id. at 33, 354-55 (preface letter from EPA Adm’r).
136. Id. at 44, 355-60 (letter from Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce,
Transportation, and Energy to Adm’r Susan E. Dudley, Office of Info. and Reg.
Affairs, Office of Mgmt and Budget, dated July 9, 2008, responding to draft of
ANPR).  The response letters are published in the ANPR after Administrator John-
son’s preface.
137. Id. at 44, 482.
138. See, e.g., id. at 35, 555-60 (letter from Adm’r Dudley to EPA Adm’r John-
son regarding ANPR draft) (“[The draft] suggests that a regulatory program based
on [a NAAQS] might permit the adoption of a nationwide cap-and-trade pro-
gram”); id. at 44, 366 (letter from Dept. of Energy responding to draft) (“The draft
has the overall effect of suggesting that under the CAA, as it exists today, it would
be possible to develop a regulatory scheme of trading programs and other mecha-
nisms to regulate GHG emissions and thus effectively address global climate
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Commerce, Transportation, and Agriculture and other cabinet
members that agreed that the “Clean Air Act is a deeply flawed and
unsuitable vehicle for reducing greenhouse gas emissions,” Admin-
istrator Susan Dudley of the Office of Management and Budget re-
sponded that “[the ANPR] draft . . . relies on untested legal
theories to suggest . . . that a regulatory program based on [a
NAAQS] might permit the adoption of a nationwide cap-and-trade
program.”139  As noted by some alarmed officials at the Department
of Energy, “the ANPR seems to make a case for the CAA being a
proper vehicle to meaningfully combat global climate change.”140
Returning to the design issue, the CAA can meaningfully com-
bat climate change, because the design problem can be solved in
three steps.  First, EPA can establish an ambitious Secondary
NAAQS for GHGs with an attainment date in the far distant fu-
ture.141  Second, EPA can utilize the “but for emissions emanating
from outside of the United States” provision of section 179B to en-
able the States to maintain control over their emissions-reduction
plans and not have to do more than their bit part to solve this
global problem.142  Third, EPA can deem that all regions have an
attainment status of “unclassifiable” over the long-term,143 which
should avoid the dreaded, perpetual nationwide-nonattainment for
all practical purposes.
As for the thresholds problem, it could be managed because
EPA and state agencies can promulgate new rules governing the
enforcement of the Act’s permitting provisions in three simple
ways.  First, EPA and state agencies could reduce the number of
regulated entities by redefining the term “potential” in “potential to
change.”); see also id. at 44, 376 (letter from Dept. of Commerce responding to
draft) (“The CAA is designed to regulate major sources of traditional pollutants,
but applying those the standards to GHGs could result in Clean Air Act regulation
of small businesses, schools, hospitals, and churches.”).
139. Id. at 44, 355-60.
140. Id. at 44, 371 (“The Department of Commerce’s fundamental concern
with . . . using the CAA to regulate GHGs is that it would impose significant costs
on U.S. workers, consumers, and producers and harm U.S. competitiveness with-
out necessarily producing meaningful reductions in global GHG emissions.”); id.
at 44, 375 (response by Dept. of Commerce).  “Using the CAA to address climate
change would . . . put U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage by raising their
input costs compared to foreign competitors, likely resulting in emissions leakage
outside of the [U.S.] and energy-intensive firms relocating to less regulated coun-
tries. [This] would not be beneficial to the environment or the U.S. economy.” Id.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (2012).
142. See id. § 7509a(a).
143. See id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii); infra Part II.
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emit,”144 to more closely match a source’s actual emissions,145 and
push the boundaries on the definition of a “significant increase in
emissions”146 with regard to what constitutes a “modification”147 re-
quiring a PSD permit.  Next, EPA and state agencies could drasti-
cally alleviate the regulatory burden on the newly regulated, smaller
sources by enabling an applicant to quickly obtain a PSD permit by
signing a PSD application with a checked box acknowledging that
the ‘the applicant’s facility is implementing the best available con-
trol technology (BACT) that its owners and operators can afford to
reduce emissions.’  The application could also require sources to
fill in a short paragraph explaining their BACT.148  Regulators
would still make “case-by-case” determinations on BACT; they
would just give applicants the benefit of the doubt.149  Finally, EPA
and state agencies could still comply with the CAA provisions re-
quiring a public hearing for each permit application.  The hearings
for non-anyway sources would just need to be very short and
sweet.150
For perspective, in UARG, Justice Scalia went on ad nauseam
about the heavy procedural burdens imposed by PSD and Title
V,151 but the federal government does maintain post offices
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(1) (defining major emitting facility), 7602(j) (defin-
ing major stationary source as any source that “directly emits, or has the potential
to emit [100 tpy] or more of any air pollutant”).
145. Contra 40 C.F.R. § 51.66(4) (“Potential to emit means the maximum ca-
pacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical and operational
design”).  This figure often far exceeds a source’s actual annual emissions.
146. 40 C.F.R. § 51.66(4) (“Major modification means any physical change in
or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source that would
result in: a significant emissions increase . . . of a regulated NSR pollutant . . . and a
significant net emissions increase of that pollutant from the major stationary
source”).
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(2)(C), 7411(a)(4).  “The term ‘modification’ means
any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary
source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or
which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.” Id.
148. See id. § 7475(a)(4); see also id. § 7479(3), codified almost verbatim in 40
C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(12).
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).  One could argue that by “taking into account
. . . economic impacts and other costs,” a “permitting authority” could simply ask
applicants of “non-anyway sources” whether they will be using the BACT that they
can afford to reduce emissions, get an affirmative yes, have individual applicants
enumerate what the source’s BACT is (to meet the “case-by-case” requirement),
and grant the PSD permit.
150. See id. §§ 7475(a)(2), 7661a(b)(6); see also infra notes 162-63 and 195-
204 and accompanying text and Part XIII.B for possible pro forma solutions to
other requirements.
151. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990); id. at 860-64 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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throughout the nation and there’s no confrontation clause like that
in the Constitution for criminal proceedings or any statutory provi-
sion that would prohibit the use of remote technology for public
hearings and the rapid issuance of permits.152  Perhaps a PSD per-
mit applicant for a non-anyway source in remote northern Idaho
could appear at her local post office at an appointed time, enter a
separate but public room, be greeted on live-screens by an adminis-
trative law judge and government attorney, fill out a single-page ap-
plication, hand it to the one clerk in the room, and be issued a
permit in five minutes.  Additionally, a legal interpretation of stand-
ing akin to that in Massachusetts v. EPA should prevent obstruction-
ists from blocking or delaying the issuance of her permit.153  Only a
state could arguably achieve standing to litigate the matter in such a
scenario.
If met with sufficient international support, such a GHG
NAAQS scheme could protect public welfare from climate change
without causing significant economic disruption.  Putting aside the
international dynamics for now, there would nonetheless be sub-
stantial challenges on the domestic front.  Congress and the Presi-
dent would have to hold steady and not change the law, and the
States would have to achieve decadal emission-reduction milestones
that amount to an approximate nineteen percent reduction in
emissions per decade on average.154  This reduction would be a
huge undertaking, requiring coordination with and support from
practically every other department and agency in the land as the
nation fundamentally changes its energy infrastructure over the
coming decades,155 not to mention daring innovation if we are to
ever get to “net-zero” GHG emissions around 2072.156
Americans have, however, proven innovative when survival,
high stakes, or money is on the line,157 and the CAA that Congress
152. Id.
153. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (“We stress here . . . It is of considera-
ble relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it
was in Lujan, a private individual”) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61, 572 n. 7 (1992)); cf. id. at 535-36 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
154. See infra Parts VI and IX.A, infra note 356 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part IX.
156. See infra note 356 (noting that approximate nineteen percent reduction
per decade, based on 2014 emissions levels, is an approximate straight-line reduc-
tion to “net zero” in 2072); infra note 371 and accompanying text (explaining “net
zero”).
157. See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin; Alexander Bell; Nikola Tesla; Early 19th
Century Railroad Companies; the Remington Colt 45; the Polio vaccine; open-
heart surgery; machine-guns, tanks, and industrial level artillery in Word War I;
Marie Curie; Standard Oil; Ford Motor Company; the mobilization and fighting in
25
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passed in 1970, enhanced in 1977, and to a fair extent globalized in
1990 has long been known for its “technology-forcing” ability.158
The argument of ‘but the technology does not yet exist!’ has been a
losing one in CAA cases before the Court,159 and so would it be, I
argue, if the GHG NAAQS regulation proposed by this paper were
pursued by EPA and presented to the Court after a challenge.
If such a regulatory regime were implemented, the difficult de-
cisions on how and where to reduce emissions would primarily be
made at the state and regional level through State Implementation
Plans (SIPs) or Federal Implementation Plans (FIPs) in their stead.
States have been described as ‘laboratories of democracy,’160 and
under this regime, they would be laboratories of emissions reduc-
tion as well, with each state figuring out how to reduce emissions on
its own, whether through renewable energy, nuclear power, carbon
capture sequestration (CCS),161 a carbon price, genetically modi-
fied trees, or whatever works.
Although this essentially “cap-and-trade” regulation may shock
analysts at fossil-fuel-industry-funded think-tanks, Congress clearly
endorsed the use of market mechanisms in the NAAQS program.
Moreover, EPA and states have developed and been using cap-and-
trade programs in the NAAQS regulation of criteria air pollutants
for over two decades.162
Another thing that scholars do not seem to realize is the fact
that CO2 has no localized effects, an oft-heard criticism in the dis-
sents of Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia,163 provides an advantage
World War II; the Manhattan Project; jet travel and airline safety; NASA and the
Space Race; IBM and Texas Instruments; the Food Revolution; AIDS prevention;
the Internet and Google; Steve Jobs and Apple; GPS and Satellites; Mark Zuck-
erburg and Facebook; cancer research; the Horizontal Drilling and Hydraulic
Fracturing Revolution; and Elon Musk and his vertically-landing rockets.
158. See, e.g., Giovinazzo, supra note 5, at 107 (“Congress designed the CAA to
be ‘technology forcing’—to force the development of as-yet unforeseen solutions
to air pollution”); see also Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 Yale L.J.
1713 (1979).
159. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976); cf. Whit-
man v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (barring consideration of
cost in NAAQS setting process).
160. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
161. See, e.g., IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, supra note 59, at 119
(noting that “CCS [. . .] would allow for the utilization of coal while cutting
emissions”).
162. See generally ANPR, supra note 43, at 44,411.
163. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 350 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part) (Thomas, J., joining) (“BACT analysis, like the rest of the
Clean Air Act, was developed for use in regulating the emission of conventional
pollutants and is simply not suited for use with respect to greenhouse gases” (em-
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over “conventional pollutants” with regard to market mechanisms
and other key parts of NAAQS regulation. In many respects, the
NAAQS regulation of CO2 would be much easier, because the lit-
any of CAA provisions and volumes of regulations over a pollutant’s
local effects and the endless litigation over emissions wafting across
state and regional boundaries and causing nonattainment down-
wind could all be effectively bypassed.  Local variances in ambient
CO2 concentrations due to winds, seasons, and geography and
anomalous fluctuations would be immaterial under this scheme.
The only concentration that would matter is the globally ambient
annual concentration, which can be obtained in remote places like
the NOAA site on Mount Manua Loa in Hawaii.164  Thus, the trad-
ing of CO2 emissions, however executed by the States, should be
almost totally unencumbered by the complex and time-consuming
issues over local and regional effects that accompany the regulation
of “conventional” pollutants.
Under the scheme proposed by this paper, for instance, if a
state were to fall short of the requisite nineteen percent reduction
one decade, it would not matter so long as another state or group
of other states reduce more than nineteen percent to recover the
loss.  The only material figure would be the U.S. emissions reduc-
tion percentage in the aggregate.  And if a given state is unable to
account for its emissions, through trading, EPA would ultimately
impose its own FIP on the state to see that the requirement is met.
The EPA Administrator, by his or her own authority, could also
block federal highway funding for the state to gain compliance.165
On the international front, it would be a long and hard strug-
gle to get other nations on board.  Doing so would require the crea-
tive application of hard economic power.166  The United States
would need many powerful allies on this front; in addition to, I ar-
gue, a commitment to the principles of free enterprise, minimal
government intrusion, and fair competition, as well as a “trust but
phasis added)); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that problems associated with CO2 concentrations “bear little
resemblance to what would naturally be termed ‘air pollution’”).
164. See One Year of CO2 Daily and Weekly Means at Mauna Loa, NAT. OCEANIC &
ATMOS. ADMIN., http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/weekly.html (last vis-
ited July 14, 2019).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (2012).
166. See ANPR, supra note 43 and accompanying text, at 44, 371 (response
from Dept. of Commerce).  The United States would have to work to prevent
“emissions leakage” and U.S. energy-intensive firms from being placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage.  A full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper,
but it is relevant that this regulation would become increasingly costly and argua-
bly futile if other nations were to not reduce emissions in kind.
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verify system”167 with satellites like those comprising NASA’s Orbit-
ing Carbon Observatory to monitor emissions.168
Will it likely be done? No. But could it feasibly be accomplished
in accordance with the existing law of the Clean Air Act? Yes.
In Part II of this paper, I provide a primer on the NAAQS pro-
gram.  In Parts IV-VI, I cover how the design problem can be solved
and how the thresholds problem could be managed in depth.  In
Part VII, I delve into the history of GHG regulation under the CAA
generally and the GHG NAAQS issue specifically.  In Part IX, I pro-
pose a regulatory scheme based on a long-range Secondary NAAQS
of 350 CO2/CO2eq ppm by the year 2351 and explain how this is
both ambitious and arguably realistic.  In Part X, I cover the “Chev-
ron two-step.”  Finally, in Part XIV, I offer an alternative strategy of
using a GHG NAAQS as leverage to coerce Congress to pass a bold,
steadily-increasing price on carbon emissions that is practically reve-
nue-neutral, with proceeds going to American households to offset
any increased energy costs.  I then conclude with a quote by our
President in Part XV.
II. THE NAAQS PROGRAM
Congress created the NAAQS program of the CAA to eliminate
dangerous concentrations of criteria air pollutants in the nation’s
outside air.  According to section 108(a)(1), criteria air pollutants
are those pollutants whose presence in the ambient air derives from
numerous or diverse sources and whose emissions cause or contrib-
ute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.169  As Section 108(a)(1) reads:
For the purpose of establishing national primary and sec-
ondary ambient air quality standards, the Administrator
shall within 30 days after December 31, 1970, publish, and
shall from time to time thereafter revise, a list which in-
cludes each air pollutant—
(A) emissions of which, in his [or her] judgment,
cause or contribute to air pollution which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare;
167. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Signing of the INF Treaty with
Soviet Premier Gorbachev, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 8, 1987).
168. See Patrick Lynch, Eye-Popping View of CO2, Critical Step for Carbon-Cycle
Science, NASA’S GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.
nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/eye-popping-view-of-co2-critical-step-for-carbon-
cycle-science.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).
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(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued
before December 31, 1970 but for which he [or she]
plans to issue air quality criteria under this section.170
As mentioned, some scholars have concluded that the EPA Ad-
ministrator is now obligated to list GHGs like CO2 and CH4 as a
collective criteria air pollutant or as individual criteria air pollutants
under section 108(a)(1), given that the presence of GHGs emis-
sions in the outside air derives from numerous and diverse sources
and EPA has already found that the gases pose a danger to public
welfare and health under Title II.171  Most scholars, however, seem
to now conclude that, in light of UARG, the Supreme Court could
easily find ambiguity in section 108(a)(1)(C) or some other key
part to hold that EPA is not compelled to make such a listing—and
all the more so if such a listing would cause economic calamity.172
Regardless, the EPA Administrator has the authority to list a
pollutant as a criteria air pollutant under section 108.  Once this
listing is made, EPA must thereafter issue the “criteria” documents
and publish a proposed NAAQS for the pollutant within twelve
months.173  Essentially, the NAAQS is a maximum permissible air
concentration for a pollutant in the outside air requisite to protect
public health and/or welfare.174  Also, Supreme Court case law pro-
hibits EPA from considering economic costs when setting a
NAAQS,175 which is arguably the most powerful aspect of the
NAAQS program and the entire statute.
Once a pollutant’s NAAQS is set, the States are then called
upon to develop and implement plans (SIPs) that will achieve air
concentrations of the pollutant within their borders that do not ex-
ceed the NAAQS by a key future date.176  Achieving this goal is
called “attaining” a NAAQS.177  In the event that the aforemen-
170. Id.
171. See McCubbin, supra note 5, at 452; Richardson, supra note 17, at 284; cf.
Clean Air Act Mechanisms for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 20 AIR POLLUTION
CONSULTANT 1.3, 1.5 (2010) (“While EPA has no current plans to issue a NAAQS
for greenhouse gases, it may be required to do so through litigation”).
172. See, e.g., Hennessee, supra note 37, at 1100.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a); see generally supra note 45.
174. Id. § 7409(b).
175. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. States must submit plans within 3 years after the pro-
mulgation of a NAAQS. Id. § 7410(a)(1).
177. Id. § 7410.
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tioned section 179B is relied upon, States can develop and imple-
ment SIPs that would attain the NAAQS by that particular standard’s
deadline but for international emissions of the pollutant.178  Should
a state fail to present and implement a SIP that will attain the
NAAQS by deadline or, at the very least, would attain the NAAQS
by deadline but for international emissions, EPA will ultimately im-
pose a FIP on the state to ensure compliance with the require-
ment.179  Practitioners often colorfully describe the latter as
“getting FIPPED.”180
There are, importantly, two types of NAAQS, and each comes
with a different attainment deadline.  The first, a Primary NAAQS,
is the standard designed to protect public health.181  A Primary
NAAQS must be attained in five to twelve years.  This attainment
timeline is prescribed by the Act.182  However, for the second type
of NAAQS, a Secondary NAAQS, which is designed to protect pub-
lic welfare,183 there is no rigid attainment-timeline.  The Act simply
requires that a Secondary NAAQS be attained “as expeditiously as
possible.”184  As will be explained in Part VI, bringing the global
ambient CO2 concentration back down to the level that it was at
just a few decades ago “as expeditiously as possible” will take a very
long time. But therein lies the rub for making a GHG NAAQS
work.185
The ultimate goal of the NAAQS program is attainment, and to
achieve this goal, Congress explicitly endorsed the use of market
mechanisms in section 110.186  Under the authority of this section,
178. Id. § 7509a(a).
179. Id. § 7410(c). See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 53 (“EPA is required
to promulgate a FIP within two years after finding that the state has failed to make
its required SIP submission or that the state’s submission does not meet the CAA’s
minimum completeness criteria for SIPs”).
180. Laura Leslie, Senate seeks to stall new EPA rules, WRAL (July 22, 2015),
https://www.wral.com/senate-seeks-to-stall-new-epa-rules/14789125/.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (describing “National Primary Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standard”).
182. See id. § 7502(a)(2)(A) (requiring attainment in five years but enabling
Administrator to extend period to 10 years); see also id. § 7502(a)(2)(C) (enabling
Administrator to extend additional two years).
183. Id. § 7409(b)(2) (describing “National Secondary Ambient Air Quality
Standard”).
184. Id. § 7502(a)(2)(B).
185. See infra Parts VI and IX.
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). “Each such plan shall—(A) include enforcea-
ble emission limitations . . .  including economic incentives such as fees, marketa-
ble permits, and auctions of emissions rights . . .  and timetables for compliance, as
may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of this chap-
ter.” Id.
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many states and cities have established what are essentially “cap-
and-trade” programs for the emissions of nitrogen oxides and vola-
tile organic compounds, which are precursors to ground-level
ozone.187  Such emissions-trading schemes have helped regions at-
tain and maintain the ozone NAAQS and other NAAQSs for
years.188
Overall, if the first pillar of the NAAQS program is the actual
NAAQS and the second is the implementation plans that States de-
vise to attain the NAAQS by deadline, or that at least would attain
the NAAQS by deadline but for international emissions, the third
pillar of the NAAQS regime comprises the permitting regulation
for major stationary sources.189 This third pillar, which offers less
discretion, comprises the preconstruction-permit programs known
as “New Source Review” (“NSR”),190 which enumerate specific con-
trol-technology standards that individual facilities must meet, as
well as the Title V operating-permit program.191  As discussed, the
thresholds problem arises from this third pillar.
In a nutshell, NSR and Title V regulate “major emitting facili-
ties” and “major stationary sources,” respectively.  As mentioned,
for regions in “attainment” or with an “unclassifiable” status, NSR
comprises “the PSD program.”192  In the context of PSD, the Act
187. See, e.g., Hannah Oakes, Regional Cap-and-Trade Program to Bring “Fracking”
States into 2015 Ozone Attainment, 29 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL L.
REV. 415, 438 (2018).
188. See, e.g., Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain
States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing
Regional Transport of Ozone (NOx SIP Call), 63 Fed. Reg. 57, 356 (Oct. 27, 1998)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96); Jessica Wilkins, The Validity of the Clean
Power Plan’s Emissions Trading Provisions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1386, 1405 (2016) (“One
important and novel aspect of the [aforementioned NOx] SIP Call was the NOx
Budget Trading Program (NBTP), which allowed sources to purchase and sell
“emissions ‘allowances’ under an overarching regional limit”); see also Michigan v.
EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001) (rejecting
challenges to NBTP). Market-mechanisms and cap-and-trade are discussed further
in Part XIII.
189. See, e.g., Oakes, supra note 187 at 420.  Scholars often describe the overall
arrangement as “cooperative federalism.” Id.
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492 (Part C of Title I, titled “Prevention of Significant
Deterioration,” applying to regions in attainment or with unclassifiable status); id.
§§ 7501-7515 (Part D of Title I, titled “Plan Requirements for Nonattainment Ar-
eas,” applying to regions in nonattainment).
191. Id. §§ 7661-7661(f).
192. See id., Ch. 85, Subch. I, Pt. C., §§ 7470-7492 (titled “Prevention of Signif-
icant Deterioration of Air Quality” and encompassing CAA sections 160-169B); id.,
Ch. 85, Subch. I, Pt. C., Subpt. I, §§ 7470-7479 (encompassing CAA sections 160-
169 and all of Part C with the exception of the “Visibility Protection” provisions)
[subpart I of Part C is hereinafter referred to as “PSD” or “PSD program” consider-
ing that the visibility provisions of Part C are seemingly inapplicable to GHGs].
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defines a “major emitting facility” as any stationary source whose
annual emissions of ”any air pollutant” potentially exceed 250 tpy
or, for certain enumerated categories, 100 tpy.193 Regarding Title
V, the Act defines a “major stationary source” almost identically,
except that the threshold is always 100 tpy.194
In such attainment or unclassifiable regions, if a group of own-
ers or operators want to build or modify195 a major emitting facility,
they must first obtain a PSD permit prior to construction.196  To
obtain a PSD permit, they must show, to the satisfaction of some
state-environmental-agency or EPA bureaucrat, that they will use
the “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) to reduce emis-
sions.197 They must also demonstrate, under section 110, a “system
of continuous emissions reduction”198 and, under section 165, that
their emissions will not violate any “maximum allowable increase or
. . . concentration . . . in any area” or any emissions standard or
standard of performance under the CAA, to include not causing
nonattainment downwind.199  Complying with section 165 is often a
headache for owners and operators of major sources emitting con-
ventional pollutants, but compliance with this provision could be
easily demonstrated and such downwind matters quickly dispensed
with in the context of CO2.200
Regulators must determine BACT on a “case-by-case” basis ac-
cording to the Act201 and hold a public hearing on each applica-
tion.202  As mentioned, to legally operate a major stationary source,
owners and operators must also obtain a Title V operating per-
mit.203  A Title V permit comes with no substantive requirement on
its own; rather, the permit requires an accounting of compliance
with all regulations stemming from the Act applicable to that
source, which usually means more paperwork. Title V does, how-
193. Id. § 7479(1) (defining “major emitting facility” within PSD and stating
both thresholds and the enumerated categories for the 100 tpy threshold).
194. Id. §§ 7661(2)(B), citing id. § 7602(j) (stating the Act-wide definition for
the terms “major emitting facility” or “major stationary source” and that the 100
tpy threshold applies “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided”).
195. See supra notes 146 and 147.
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C).
197. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
198. Id. § 7410(j).
199. Id. § 7475(a)(3).
200. See generally id. § 7410; supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text; infra
notes 207-208 and accompanying text; infra Part XIII.B.4.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining BACT).
202. Id. § 7475(a)(2), (c).
203. Id. § 7661a(a).
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ever, come with procedural requirements.204  Like with PSD, public
hearing must be held on each application, and an interested party
can appeal the decision at the administrative level and ultimately in
state or federal court if they have standing.205  As stated earlier in
Part I.B, the public hearings over PSD and Title V permits could be
quick affairs for non-anyway sources of GHGs.  Furthermore, the
massive mess of litigation over local effects and interstate-transport
of emissions could be avoided in the case of GHGs.  That is, that
CO2 emissions have no direct, localized effects should enable par-
ties to effectively bypass the complex demonstrations required by
section 165206 and enable the courts to deny standing to petty ob-
structionists and any party but a state.207
Ultimately, should a region fail to attain a NAAQS and run out
of time on the deadline, that region will fall into nonattainment.208
The Nonattainment New Source Review (NNSR) provisions com-
prising Part D of Title I of the Act govern New Source Review for
major emitting facilities in nonattainment regions.209  NNSR sub-
jects owners and operators of major emitting facilities to onerous
regulations.  Among other things, NNSR requires offsets,210 autho-
rizes and encourages fees,211 and requires, instead of BACT, the
rather extreme “Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate” (LAER)212 for
the permitted construction of a new major emitting facility or modi-
fication of an existing one.213  Nonattainment can be viewed as a
punitive measure, because it can seriously impair the industrial
204. See generally UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323 (2014) (explaining required
procedures under Title V).
205. See generally CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 177-180 (explaining public
hearing requirement and appeals procedure).
206. See infra Part XIII.
207. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d), 7501(2).
209. See generally id. §§ 7501-7515 (stating plan requirements for nonattain-
ment areas).
210. Id. § 7503(c).  This requirement stands to have the most devastating eco-
nomic impact under a nonattainment GHG NAAQS scenario. See Lewis supra note
52 (concluding that offsets in a nonattainment GHG NAAQS scenario would lead
to a “de-facto moratorium on [economic] growth”).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(6).
212. Id. § 7501(3).
213. For other requirements, see id. §§ 7502 (“Nonattainment plan provisions
in general”), 7509 (“Sanctions and consequences of failure to attain”); see also, e.g.,
id. §§ 7507 (“New motor vehicle emission standards in nonattainment areas”),
7506a (“Interstate transport commissions”).
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growth of a region, but its ultimate purpose is to get a region back
into attainment.214
Overall, EPA and the States have powerful incentives to see
their regions attain and maintain the NAAQSs.  For example, at-
taining and maintaining the ozone NAAQS, which was recently low-
ered and thereby made harder to achieve, has been an ongoing
struggle for hundreds of regions and most large cities.215  In fact,
one of the reasons Congress added the PSD program in the 1977
Amendments, arguably its sole reason,216 was to “prevent[ ]” nonat-
tainment.217  Numerous regions, most major cities, and every major
metropolis in the U.S. are at various levels of nonattainment, from
moderate to severe, for at least one criteria air pollutant.218  State,
county, and city governments are familiar with the NAAQS regula-
tions and acutely aware of the economic costs of nonattainment.
Finally, the CAA requires that a NAAQS be reviewed every five
years,219 and because the economic impact of nonattainment can
cost a region billions of dollars, there are extensive lobbying efforts
by states, cities, and industry groups to prevent EPA from lowering a
NAAQS upon each review, especially for the ozone standard.220  In
fact, some legislators have at times introduced legislation that
would prevent EPA from setting tougher standards.
Again, should a state become recalcitrant, EPA has the option
of cutting off federal highway funding for the state under the
Act.221  No EPA Administrator has ever done this, but Congress did
give EPA this tool to gain compliance.
214. Demonstrating LAER and finding offsets for a source, so that there is no
net addition in emissions of a criteria air pollutant within a region, are often the
toughest challenge for owners and operators. See id. § 7503(c) (explaining offset
requirement).
215. See generally CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 5-8 (outlining history of
Act); see also CURRENT NONATTAINMENT COUNTIES FOR ALL CRITERIA AIR POLLU-
TANTS, EPA GREENBOOK, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl.html
(last visited Jul. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NONATTAINMENT COUNTIES] (listing nonat-
tainment counties).
216. Cf. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL
6621785, at *15 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
217. 42 U.S.C., Ch. 85, Subch. I, Pt. C, Subpt. I.
218. NONATTAINMENT COUNTIES supra note 216.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(B).
220. See James E. McCarthy & Kate Shouse, Implementing EPA’s 2015 Ozone Air
Quality Standards, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R43092, p. 4 (Aug. 16,
2018), http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43092 (discussing drastic
impact of EPA tightening standard).  In 2015, EPA’s lowering the O3 NAAQS from
.75 parts-per-billion (ppb) to .70 ppb caused fifty-two regions spanning 200 coun-
ties or partial counties and two tribal areas to fall into nonattainment. Id.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1).
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Suffice to say, the NAAQS program of the CAA is powerful stat-
utory law and more than a little complex, and environmental regu-
lation by EPA and the States under its provisions has spawned an
immense amount of litigation over the years.  But scholars and his-
torians cannot deny that this “central construct” of the CAA has
stood the test of time, and although many cities struggle to attain
the standards for ozone and particulate matter,222 the NAAQS pro-
gram has generally proven effective in mostly eliminating danger-
ous concentrations of the criteria pollutants across the nation.223
A good number of scholars, EPA officials, and Justices Alito
and Thomas believe, however, that this effectiveness is limited to
those pollutants that are “conventional” by nature or have “local-
ized effects.”224  The terms “conventional pollutants,” “conventional
gases,” “traditional gases,” “traditional pollutants,” “localized” or
“local effects” appear nowhere in the Act, but they seem to be used
to describe regional pollutants with short atmospheric lives that
pose direct threats to health or welfare.  CO2 and CH4 do not share
these characteristics; but that should not mean that CO2 and other
GHGs like methane get a free pass, especially not when there is a
way for the NAAQS program to work as designed for GHGs and,
possibly, protect public welfare from the dangers of climate change
without impairing economic growth.
III. RISING CONCENTRATIONS OF CO2 AND CO2EQ ARE
UNDOUBTEDLY A THREAT TO PUBLIC WELFARE UNDER THE
CAA, BUT WHAT ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH?
The Secondary GHG NAAQS regulation proposed in this arti-
cle would start with the EPA Administrator listing GHGs as a collec-
tive criteria air pollutant and, within that listing, identifying the
rising GHG concentrations causing climate change as a threat to
public welfare.225  Such an endangerment finding, with regard to
222. See NONATTAINMENT COUNTIES supra note 216.
223. See CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 2-9 (describing NAAQS program
development); see also, e.g., Popovich supra note 9 (explaining improvements in air
quality).
224. See Nordhaus, supra note 4, at 61 (“Criteria pollutant regulation, as it was
originally conceived in 1970, was designed to deal with localized concentrations of
pollutants with short-residence times in the atmosphere”); Jonathan Adler, Massa-
chusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less Than Administrative Law: A Comment on
Professors Watts and Wildermuth, 102 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 32, 39-40 (2007) (“the
SIP process was designed for controlling localized, ambient pollution problems,
not protecting the global atmosphere”), citing Jonathan Wiener, Think Globally, Act
Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007); see also
supra note 163.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
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welfare, would be reiterative of the EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Find-
ing.226  Given the current and anticipated impacts of human-made
climate change227 and Congress’ addition of “effects . . . on climate”
in the NAAQS provision on welfare in 1990, such a finding should
not be surprising.228
The GHG NAAQS regulation proposed by this article, how-
ever, would also require that the EPA Administrator refrain from
identifying climate change as a threat to public health within the
criteria-air-pollutant listing, because such a finding would require
the establishment of a Primary NAAQS for GHGs.229  As this paper
will cover in Part VII.E, a Primary NAAQS for GHGs simply cannot
work as designed and would devastate the U.S. economy. One
should not have to “destroy the town to save it,” as the saying goes,
from global warming.230  Bottom-line, for any GHG NAAQS regula-
tory regime to stand a chance of being upheld by the Supreme
Court, it cannot include a Primary NAAQS.231
Arguing that climate change is a threat to public welfare but
not public health, at least as those terms are defined in the NAAQS
provisions, might not come naturally to environmentalists.  Perhaps
this is another reason why a long-range, Secondary NAAQS-only
pathway has not been considered more.  Nevertheless, a version of
the argument can be made without denying the ill-effects on public
health, as that term is normally defined, from global warming in
excess of 1.5° Celsius.232
To begin, extreme weather events often kill people, and the
global warming brought on by the rising level of global CO2/
226. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 30, at 66,496.
227. See IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 76, at 1-20; IPCC,
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5, supra note 15, at 12 fig. SPM.7, 14 fig. SPM.8; see also
Steffan, Rockstro¨m, Richardson et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthro-
pocene, 115 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (PNAS) 8252, 8252-59
(2018), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/33/8252.full.pdf (exploring risk
of creating an irrevocable “Hot House Earth”).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
229. See id. § 7408(a).
230. Peter Arnett, Major Describes Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1968, p. 14 (stating
“It became necessary to destroy the town to save it”).  The United States Major who
said this “was talking about the decision by allied commanders to bomb and shell
the town regardless of civilian casualties to rout the Vietcong.”
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (stating that one of the purposes of Title I is
to promote not only the nation’s “public health and welfare” but also “the produc-
tive capacity of its population”); Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 360-61, 360
n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (recognizing a limitation on EPA’s authority to enforce CAA
in ways that lead to “futile results”); see also Reitze, supra note 56, at 417; ANPR,
supra note 134, at 44,481; Glaser, supra note 52, at 52-53.
232. See IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 76, at 1-20.
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CO2eq is, indeed, causing more extreme weather events.233  There
will also be a lot more extreme weather events causing death and
mayhem if the world heats up by 3-5° Celsius by 2100, as projected
under a business-as-usual scenario, and heats up more and more
thereafter.234 For perspective, 6°C is the approximate difference be-
tween an ice age and interglacial warm period.235  Nevertheless,
Congress saw fit to include “effects on . . . weather . . . and climate”
in the provision on public welfare in the CAA and not in the provi-
sion for public health.236
To avoid the pitfall posed by a Primary NAAQS, the no-local-
ized-effects nature of CO2 should once again help.  That is, CO2
emissions pose no direct, “localized,” or regional threat to public
health; rather, the threat stems only from the global aggregate of
CO2 and CH4 over the long-term.237 Breathing in outside air with
triple or even quadruple the average preindustrial level of global
CO2 has no physiological effect on the human body.238  Thus, the
EPA Administrator should be able to avoid concluding that CO2 in
the ambient air is a threat to public health in a section 108
listing.239
As for public welfare, the rise of global CO2/CO2eq, with its
“effects on . . . climate,” is most definitely a threat, especially if one
gives any consideration whatsoever to future generations.240  Doing
nothing about CO2 emissions will destine future generations to a
233. See Thomas Karl & Richard Katz, A New Face for Climate Dice, 109 PNAS
14720 (Sept. 11, 2012) (contrasting likeliness of extreme weather today than ear-
lier decades); James Hansen, Makiko Sato, & Reto Ruedy, Perception of Climate
Change, 109 PNAS E2415 (2012); see also Andrew Revkin, How Humans are Loading
the Climate Dice, N.Y. TIMES: DOT EARTH (Apr. 8, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://
dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/a-fresh-look-at-how-humans-are-loading-
climate-dice/ (discussing James Hansen’s updated analysis of greenhouse gases im-
pact on extreme weather).
234. See R.E. Kopp, K. Hayhoe, D.R. Easterling et al., Potential Surprises - Com-
pound Extremes in FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOL I., U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, 411-429 (D.J. Wuebbles et al., eds.2017), http://sci
ence2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf; see also Hans
Joachim Schellnhuber et al., Turn Down the Heat, Why a 4 Degrees C Warmer World
Must Be Avoided, A Report for the World Bank by the Potsdam Inst. for Climate Impact
Research and Climate Analytics, POTSDAM INST. xiv (Nov. 2012), http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/pdf/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf.
235. Id. at 30 fig. 27.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
237. See, e.g., ANPR, supra note 43, at 44,427 (“Current and projected levels of
ambient concentrations of the six GHGs are not expected to cause any direct ad-
verse health effects, such as respiratory or toxic effects”).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 44,478.
240. See FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 235, at 411-29.
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“denuded world;”241 one that stands to be, in many ways, ruined
ecologically, impaired economically, and possibly irrevocably politi-
cally de-stabilized.242  Again, doing nothing long enough should
single-handedly usher in earth’s sixth mass-extinction event, and
that diversity of life lost would not come back for eons, if at all.243
And to think, it will only have taken a few hundred years of modern
industrial civilization for human beings to accomplish.
IV. SOLVING THE DESIGN PROBLEM WITH A WELFARE-BASED, LONG-
RANGE SECONDARY GHG NAAQS WITH A 350 PPM TARGET ON
A TIMESCALE APPLICABLE TO THE INEVITABLE RISE AND
HOPEFUL FALL OF GLOBAL CO2
The long-range Secondary NAAQS scheme this paper proposes
would avoid the perpetual, nationwide status of nonattainment that
has plagued every single proposal for a Primary GHG NAAQS.244
The attainment date would be far off under this Secondary GHG
NAAQS scheme, but such a framework would nevertheless demand
unprecedented ambition and quick action, with the U.S. and its cli-
mate allies substantially reducing emissions starting immediately
and getting other nations to do the same,245 lest “emissions leak-
age” take effect and start killing U.S. jobs.246  Environmentalists un-
familiar with the physics and timelines of climate change science
might criticize this scheme’s far-off attainment date, but it is the
long-range aspect of this scheme that affords not only ambition, but
241. David Roberts, If You Aren’t Worried About Climate Change, You Aren’t Pay-
ing Attention, GRIST (Jan. 10, 2013), http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarm-
ism-the-idea-is-surreal/.
242. See ANPR, supra note 43, at 44,427 (projecting extreme consequences of
climate change).
243. See Mark C. Urban, Accelerating Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 348
SCIENCE 571 (May 1, 2015); Illya M. D. Maclean & Robert J. Wilson, Recent Ecological
Responses to Climate Change Support Predictions of High Extinction Risk, 108 PNAS
12,337 (July 26, 2011); Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change,
427 NATURE 145–148 (Jan. 8, 2004).
244. Cf. Crystal & Siegel et al., supra note 44, at 240; Rich Raiders, How EPA
Could Implement a Greenhouse Gas NAAQS, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 276
(2011); Ari R. Lieberman, Turning Lemons Into Lemonade: Utilizing the NAAQS Provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act to Comprehensively Address Climate Change, 21 BUFF. ENVTL. L.
J. 1, 7-8 (2014); Kassie Siegel, Kevin Bundy, & Vera Pardee, Strong Law, Timid Imple-
mentation. How the EPA Can Apply the Full Force of the Clean Air Act to Address the
Climate Crisis, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 217 (2012).
245. See IPCC, 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5, supra note 15, at 8-9 (SPM 2.1)
(identifying RCP2.6 as most stringent mitigation scenario); Meinshausen et al.,
supra note 59, at 215 n.1 (2011) (explaining both RCP 3-PD and RCP 2.6 “can be
used interchangeably”).
246. ANPR (response by Dept. of Commerce), supra note 140 and accompa-
nying text, at 44,375.
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also flexibility, practicability, and perhaps just enough time for mar-
ket mechanisms247 to take effect248 and for the rest of the world to
make in-kind reductions to avert dangerous climate change.249
As for the role of individual States, to do their part to achieve
the long-range Secondary GHG NAAQS target proposed by this ar-
ticle, States would need to reduce their emissions by approximately
nineteen percent per decade on average, based on 2014 levels, and
achieve “net zero” emissions around 2072.250  Alas, this would be
very difficult.  “Net zero”251 is almost inconceivable at this point in
time.  However, a fifty-seven percent reduction over thirty years
without significant economic cost is definitely in the realm of possi-
ble.252  That being said, the regulation of GHGs through a Secon-
247. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
248. See generally David Hone, What Can Really Be Done by 2050?, CLIMATE
CHANGE NAT. FORUM (Feb. 15, 2015), http://climatechangenationalforum.org/
by2050/ (“The development and deployment of radical new technologies takes
decades . . . [T]he IT industry. . . needed nearly [fifty] years to invent (ARPANET
in 1969) and extensively deploy the internet.”).
249. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copen-
hagen Accord, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, Art. 1, p. 5 (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf (stating that the
“ultimate objective” of the international community is to keep global increase in
temperature to below 2°C to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system”); see also infra Part IX.A.2.
250. See infra Part IX.B (explaining how achieving RCP 3PD requires U.S. and
rest of world to achieve “net zero” emissions by 2072).
251. See IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 74, at Annex I,
555 (defining “[n]et zero emissions”).  Achieving net zero emissions is also a stated
goal of the Paris Agreement of 2016, albeit one that only a handful of countries,
cities, and states are currently attempting to achieve by 2100. See United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc FCCC/
CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 1, Art. 4(1), p. 22 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/re-
source/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf (discussing voluntary terms of Paris
Agreement).
252. See, e.g., Russell Gold, Building the Wind Turbines Was Easy, The Hard Part
Was Plugging Them In, WALL STREET J. (updated Jun. 22, 2019, 12:01 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/building-the-wind-turbines-was-easy-the-hard-part-was-plug-
ging-them-in-11561176010 (reporting on Michael Skelly’s efforts to transform na-
tion’s grid infrastructure to enable substantially more energy from wind and solar
and political obstacles that stymied his efforts).
One 2016 study by [NOAA] concluded that by 2030, the U.S. could cut its
[CO2] emissions by 80%, using only existing technologies. And the cost
of power wouldn’t rise. In fact, it would be cheaper. The scenario didn’t
rely on some hoped-for storage breakthrough, just the construction of a
network of transmission lines similar to Skelly’s plans . . . . A different
group of researchers at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
[found that] to get the biggest reduction and lowest generating cost . . .
the U.S. needed to build a new overlay of transmission lines . . . . Thirty
percent was doable, they concluded. The question is 50% and beyond.
Id. (citing Alexander MacDonald et al., Future Cost-Competitive Electricity Systems and
their Impact on US CO2 Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 526 (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2921 (the NOAA study); Aaron Bloom
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dary NAAQS would increasingly become economically
disadvantageous and arguably futile if most of the rest of the world
were to not reduce their emissions in kind.  But when writing the
NAAQS provisions, Congress never asked that a state solve a global
pollution problem on its own.  Rather, in the “but for emissions
emanating from outside of the United States“ provision of section
179B, Congress only requires that a state do its part, which is what
this proposed scheme would accomplish if implemented.253  As for
the issue of getting other nations on board: that would be an ongo-
ing task for the State Department and the President.254
V. MANAGING THE THRESHOLDS PROBLEM WITH NEW RULES
Concocting a hypothetical GHG NAAQS permitting regime
that is both manageable and capable of being upheld by the Su-
preme Court is a challenge considering that, among other things,
any GHG NAAQS regime would seemingly require the preconstruc-
tion-permit and operating-permit regulation of stationary sources
of GHGs at the 250 and 100 tpy thresholds.255  But the challenges
posed by PSD and Title V are not as insurmountable as the attor-
neys for EPA claimed in their arguments before the Court in UARG.
The regulatory fallout could be contained and managed.  In
fact, like solving the design problem, managing the thresholds
problem requires no contortion of the Act’s provisions or “tailor-
ing” of its text.  Rather, the solution simply calls for the CAA to be
enforced as written.  Though with regard to the newly regulated
smaller sources, the permitting provisions would need to be en-
forced at the absolute minimum level necessary to comply with the
law, so that the burden on the newly regulated smaller sources is
drastically alleviated and regulators do not get bogged down.256
As mentioned, if the permitting provisions could be enforced
without imposing heavy regulatory and procedural burdens on the
relatively small sources, the resulting scheme would attack the as-
et al., Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study, NAT. RENEWABLE ENERGY LABO-
RATORY, NREL/TP-6A20-64472-ES, 148 (Aug. 2016), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy16osti/64472.pdf).
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(a) (2012).
254. But see 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b) (enabling foreign country to appear at public
hearing associated with any revision of state plan under certain conditions).
255. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 320 n. 6 (2014) (citing Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785 *15 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kava-
naugh, J., dissenting)); see also Hennessee, supra note 37, at 1100; id. supra note 105
and accompanying text.
256. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 322 (predicting frightening regulatory backlog
and economic costs if burden was not alleviated and regulators got bogged down).
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sumption but not the principle espoused by the Court in dictum in
UARG.257  The principle that Congress designed PSD and Title V to
only apply to those sources capable of shouldering the regulatory
burden imposed by the programs would not be challenged.258  This
would require a small revolution in the rules on how EPA and state
environmental agencies enforce the CAA’s permitting provisions;
but unlike with the law, agencies can change rules.259
Take for example a stationary source’s use of the “Best Availa-
ble Control Technology” to reduce emissions, which is the most
substantive requirement that an owner or operator must comply
with to obtain a PSD permit.260  Again, BACT must be determined
“on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental,
and economic impacts and other costs.”261  But nowhere does the
Act state the application process has to be a long, drawn-out affair.
If the administration of such permits could be drastically stream-
lined through new rules so that the regulatory burden is dramatically
alleviated, then EPA and the States could regulate the multitude of
small sources of GHGs that are swept into PSD without violating the
burden-centric principle espoused in dictum by a majority of the
Court in UARG regarding what Congress intended.
EPA and state environmental agencies could take inspiration
from the Texas Department of Public Safety (Texas DPS).  In 2016,
the Drivers Licenses Services department of the Texas DPS adminis-
tered 4.7 million examinations, issued 6.6 million drivers licenses
and identification cards, and maintained records for over 32 mil-
lion Texan citizens.262  This mass-volume regulation, however, did
not prevent Texans from getting their licenses relatively quickly or
take up a large portion of the budget.263  EPA and state environ-
mental agencies, alternatively, could take a cue from a large city’s
257. Id.
258. Id. (indicating Congress’ reasoning behind Tile V and PSD).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §3; see also UARG, 573 U.S. at 327.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (stating BACT requirements).
261. Id. § 7479(3).
262. See, e.g., Legislative Appropriations Request for Fiscal Years 2018 and
2019, Dept. of Public Safety 152 (Sept. 9, 2016), available at http://www.dps.texas.
gov/LBB/lar2018-19.pdf.
263. Compare id. at 12 (noting 121,521,549 dollars in annual expenses for
2016), with Aman Batheja & Becca Aaronson, A Closer Look at the Final 2016-17 State
Budget, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Jun. 2, 2015) http://www.texastribune.org/2015/06/
02/look-final-2016-17-budget/ (reporting that Texas government was budgeted to
spend 209.8 billion dollars over 2016 and 2017). If one were to split that two-year
budget in equal parts, then the cost of the Driving Licensing Services of the Texas
DPS comprised approximately 0.12 percent of the 2016 portion of the Texas
budget. Id.
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food inspection department that inspects over ten thousand food
establishments in a given year but somehow finds a way to protect
citizens from food poisoning and abide by city ordinances and the
law without undermining free enterprise.264  Granted, a few million
currently unregulated sources of GHGs stand to be swept into the
Title V operating-permit program, but unlike PSD, Title V comes
with no substantive requirement on its own.265  In fact, nothing in
the Act should prevent an owner or operator of some insignificant
stationary source of GHGs from obtaining an annual Title V permit
online or at a public hearing in ten minutes.
In sum, Congress established some minimum standards in the
CAA for permit applicants to meet and some procedures that regu-
lators must adhere to, but Congress never specified just how bur-
densome or time-consuming these permitting regulations must be
on businesses.  The regulatory and procedural burdens currently im-
posed on entities regulated by PSD and Title V are “heavy.”266  This
heaviness, however, is a consequence not of the law but of the rules
that EPA and States have created to enforce and abide by that
law.267  Again, an agency can change its rules. Moreover, an agency
should change its rules if they pose an obstacle to enforcing the law
to protect public health or welfare.268
Bottom-line, the thresholds problem concerns the rules—not
the law itself.  Tackling this problem calls for some substantial
changes to the rules and a different administrative philosophy
among regulators,  but what it does not require is some exotic inter-
pretation of the Constitution’s separation of powers269 or edit of
264. See, e.g., City of Chicago, Food Inspection, Forecasting (2014-2017),
http://chicago.github.io/food-inspections-evaluation/ (detailing breadth of
health inspections done by City of Chicago Dept. of Public Health) (last visited
July 14, 2019).
265. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014) (“The number of sources
required to have permits would jump from fewer than 15,000 to about 6.1 mil-
lion”), citing Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31,562-31,563.
266. UARG, 573 U.S. at 322 (discussing Title V and PSD’s  burdens).
267. See Buzbee, supra note 85, at 76.
268. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 322 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
269. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082, oral argument held (9th Cir.
June 4, 2019); Benjamin Hulac & Ellen Gilmer, Kids’ Case Tests ‘Hail Mary’ Climate
Argument, CLIMATEWIRE (“[Plaintiffs] demand a court order saying the government
has undermined their rights to a safe climate, as well as a court-mandated national
plan to phase out fossil fuels across the United States”); Brief by Appellants at 9-10,
Juliana v. United States, No. 18-3608 (“[A] single district judge may not . . .  seize
control of national energy production, energy consumption, and transportation in
the ways that would be required to implement Plaintiffs’ demanded remedies”); see
also id. at 54, citing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424, (June
20, 2011) (“We hold that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common-law right to seek abatement of [CO2] emissions from fossil-fuel
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the Act’s text.270 Finally, that the thresholds issue poses more of an
administrative challenge than a statutory obstacle should not be a
surprise.  After all, when writing the “central construct”271 of the
Act that protects public health and/or welfare from pollution deriv-
ing from “numerous or diverse sources,”272 Congress never added a
provision that said ‘if the sources are seemingly too numerous or
diverse, if international emissions contribute to the problem, or if
current rules would make enforcement difficult, then disregard
these mandates.’
VI. USING A 350 PPM TARGET AND ATTAINMENT DATE BASED ON
REPRESENTATIVE CONCENTRATION PATHWAY 3PD, WHICH HAS
A JUST BARELY, MORE-LIKELY-THAN-NOT-CHANCE OF
KEEPING GLOBAL WARMING UNDER TWO DEGREES
CELSIUS BY 2100
Ultimately, the protection of public welfare from the threat of
human-made global warming and ocean acidification requires the
reduction of CO2 concentrations in the outside air.273  As men-
tioned, however, reducing global CO2 is not something that a state
or the U.S. can achieve alone.274  According to the scientists of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Potsdam
Institute, stabilizing the trajectory of global CO2 and ultimately
bringing the concentration back down to ~350 ppm, which is where
it was in late 1980s, is a task for the entire world to accomplish over
the next few centuries.  This estimate is based on the IPCC’s Repre-
sentative Concentration Pathway 2.6 (RCP 2.6), which is the most
ambitious climate change mitigation scenario developed by scien-
tists in the IPCC’s 2014 Report and is “interchangeable” with RCP
3PD.275
fired powerplants . . . . [The] Act ‘speaks directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide
from the defendants’ plants.”).
270. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31,567.
271. Tsang & Wyatt, supra note 3, at 1.
272. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(B) (2012).
273. See Meinshausen et al., supra note 57, at 233 fig. 6; IPCC, 2014: SYNTHESIS
REPORT AR5, supra note 15, at fig. SPM.7, 14 fig. SPM.8.
274. See ANPR, supra note 43, at 44,362.
275. See Meinshausen et al., supra note 59, at 215 n. 1.
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276
276. See id. at 233 fig. 6.
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In short, no state, much less all the nations of the world work-
ing together, could ever reduce the annual ambient concentration
of CO2 in the five to twelve year timeline for a Primary NAAQS.277
Nor could a state, or the United States for that matter, have any
worthwhile influence on the trajectory of global CO2 under any
traditional timeline for a Secondary NAAQS.278  Recognizing this,
most scholars have given up on using the NAAQS program to fight
climate change, because any GHG NAAQS that is around the argua-
bly safe level of 350 ppm CO2/CO2eq with an attainment deadline
ten years or even a hundred years into the future would inevitably
be missed, resulting in “the entire country . . . [having a] nonattain-
ment status with no realistic expectation that any measure taken as
part of a SIP would lead to attainment of the standard.”279
This article demonstrates, however, that a Secondary GHG
NAAQS with an attainment date in the far distant future addresses
these issues, and it specifically proposes a Secondary GHG NAAQS
of 350 CO2/CO2eq by 2351 based on RCP 3PD280 or an updated-
RCP 3PD.  But first, a little history on the GHG NAAQS issue is
worth telling.
VII. THE HISTORY OF THE GHG NAAQS ISSUE & GHG
REGULATION UNDER THE CAA
A. Early GHG NAAQS Litigation Between Three States and EPA
in 2003
Such concerns over a GHG NAAQS as those mentioned above,
if thought of at all, did not stop the Attorneys General for Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, and Maine from once suing EPA in 2003,
demanding, albeit briefly, that EPA establish a NAAQS for
GHGs.281  This one and only lawsuit over a GHG NAAQS was short-
lived.  The Attorneys General agreed to a dismissal of the lawsuit
early on in federal district court, thankfully without prejudice.282
The three States then joined, along with a collection of other States
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Reitze, supra note 56, at 417.
280. See Meinshausen et al., supra note 59, at 215 n. 1.
281. Complaint at 4, Massachusetts v. Whitman, No. 3:03CV00984 (D. Conn.
filed June 4, 2003).  Maine and Connecticut joined Massachusetts shortly after the
complaint was filed. Id.
282. Plaintiff’s Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Massachusetts v.
Horinko, 3:03CV984 (D. Conn. voluntarily dismissed Sept. 3, 2003).
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and local governments, an appeal of EPA’s denial283 of a petition284
by the International Center for Technology Assessment and eigh-
teen other non-governmental entities.  The petition had called for
EPA to regulate GHG emissions in new motor vehicles under sec-
tion 202(a) of the Act.285
Perhaps the Attorneys General for Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and Maine analyzed how a GHG NAAQS could play out and be-
came alarmed; or perhaps they realized that given the intercon-
nected nature of the CAA, whereby regulation under one part
triggers or at least sets the conditions for triggering a cascading ef-
fect regulation in other parts, all they needed to accomplish was a
foray.  Whatever their reason, they dropped the NAAQS lawsuit
early on and moved forward with the Title II lawsuit; and it was a
good move, because that Title II lawsuit was ultimately resolved by
the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.286
B. Massachusetts v. EPA
Decided in 2007, late in President Bush 43’s administration,
Massachusetts v. EPA opened the door for EPA and the States to
regulate CO2 and other GHGs to protect public health and public
welfare from the dangers of human-made climate change.287  The
decision sent proverbial shockwaves through the halls of Congress
and walls of boardrooms.  To environmentalists, the original peti-
tioners and champions of the Act’s potential to protect the public
from climate change, the decision was a resounding success and
cause of new hope.
In the opinion, written by the recently passed Justice John Paul
Stevens, the Court held, five to four, that carbon dioxide, methane,
and the less common GHGs of nitrous oxide and hydrofluoro-
carbons are pollutants under the Act’s capacious definition of the
283. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922, 52,927 (Sept. 8, 2003) (including notice of denial of petition for
rulemaking), relying upon Memorandum from Robert Fabricant, EPA Gen. Coun-
sel, to Maryann Horinko, Acting EPA Adm’r (Aug. 28, 2003) (rebutting argument
from Cannon memo, infra note 462, at 1).
284. International Center for Technology Assessment, Petition for Rulemak-
ing and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from New Motor Vehicles Under § 202 of the Clean Air Act, at 13-24 (Oct. 20,
1999), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/greenhouse_petition_EPA.pdf (last vis-
ited July 14, 2019) (petitioning EPA Adm’r).
285. Amended Petition for Review at 1, Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2003).
286. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
287. Id. at 532-534; see also, e.g., Greenhouse supra note 28.
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term.288  The Court also held that the EPA Administrator therefore
had a non-discretionary duty to determine whether the gases en-
danger public health and welfare for purposes of Title II or, at the
very least, give some valid reason why such a determination could
not be made.289
Legal scholars and EPA officials, well aware of the CAA’s inter-
connected nature and familiar enough with the science of climate
change, instantly recognized that it would be just a matter of time,
perhaps the next administration, before GHG regulation came into
effect under Title II and then under other parts of the Act.290
C. The GHG NAAQS Issue in the Aftermath of Massachusetts v.
EPA
Massachusetts v EPA caused hand wringing among EPA officials
appointed by President Bush 43.  EPA Administer Stephen Johnson
saw the decision as a harbinger of a potentially massive expansion
of EPA authority and regulation over vast swathes of the U.S. econ-
omy, given the ubiquity of GHG emissions, the NSR and Title V
thresholds, and the potential for a GHG NAAQS.291  Yet, to his
credit and that of his successor, acting-Administer Marianne
Horinko, EPA staff were allowed to thoroughly analyze, seemingly
unimpeded, how GHG regulation under the CAA could possibly
work.  In 2014, before President Barack Obama took office, EPA
published their findings and called for comments through its pro-
mulgation of the ANPR.292  In response, EPA received over 295,000
comments.293
288. Id. at 529, 532-34 (describing Court’s holding).
289. Id. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsberg, Souter, and
Breyer. Id.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Id.
290. See, e.g., Duane Desidero, Climate Change Litigation Overview, SN005 ALI-
ABA 687, 692-93 (Aug. 2007).  “If . . . EPA [finds that] . . . GHGs do in fact endan-
ger the public by at least contributing to climate change, then . . . a snowballing
effect may occur . . . . However, the intensity of the climate change regulatory
debate will greatly amplify if EPA designates, or becomes forced to designate
through litigation, CO2 and other GHGs as criteria pollutants.” Id.
291. See ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,355 (July 30, 2008) (Preface by Adm’r
Johnson).
292. See id. at 44,397-44,520 (portions by EPA staff).
293. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Greenhouse Gases under the
Clean Air Act, Regulations.gov, EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0318, http://www.regula
tions.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0318 (last visited Jul. 16, 2019).
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1. The Surprisingly Positive Treatment of a Secondary NAAQS
Pathway in the Bush 43 EPA’s Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking
Though the ANPR’s analysis was prefaced with some
grumblings over the Massachusetts v. EPA decision by EPA Adminis-
trator Johnson,294 the authors of the ANPR nevertheless conducted
a comprehensive and rather objective analysis.295  Their conclu-
sions, to the alarm of multiple cabinet secretaries, suggested that
the CAA could possibly be “both workable and effective for address-
ing global climate change by regulating GHG emissions from statio-
nary and mobile sources of virtually every kind.”296
In fact, the ANPR is the first and only time that EPA has offi-
cially commented through the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process on the “Opportunities and Challenges Afforded by NAAQS
Pathway” for GHGs.297  It is also the first time that a government
official or scholar for that matter has explicitly pointed out that the
attainment-timeline of a Secondary NAAQS, which can be long-
term, might work for GHGs.298  As for the five to twelve year time-
line of a Primary NAAQS, however, the authors concluded that it
was “inescapably” ill-suited for GHGs: “despite active control efforts
to meet a NAAQS, the entire United States would remain in nonat-
tainment for an unknown number of years.”299
Surprisingly, EPA officials under President Bush 43, a Republi-
can, gave serious and public consideration to regulation of GHGs
through a Secondary NAAQS in the ANPR and seemingly treated it
as a feasible regulatory pathway for a comprehensive climate policy.
Again, the potential for a huge expansion in federal environmental
regulatory authority and U.S. climate regulation was not lost on Ad-
ministrator Johnson and President Bush’s other cabinet mem-
bers.300  Interestingly, like with the early GHG NAAQS lawsuit in
2003, this early positive treatment of a Secondary GHG NAAQS
pathway by EPA seems all but forgotten by scholars as of late.
294. See ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,355.
295. Id. at 44,476-44,486 (analyzing four GHG NAAQS scenarios, including
“Secondary Standard with a Country in Attainment”).  “Regulating GHGs through
a NAAQS offers certain opportunities; however, there are also significant techno-
logical, legal and program design challenges . . . .” Id. at 44,485.
296. See id. at 44,355-60 (letter from Secs. of Agriculture, Commerce, Trans-
portation, & Energy to Adm’r Susan E. Dudley).
297. Id. at 44,485.
298. See id. at 44,478, 44,481-82.
299. ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,481.
300. See id. at 44,355-75.
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2. An Apex of Debate on the GHG NAAQS Question as President
Obama Takes Office
During the tumultuous aftermath of Massachusetts v. EPA, but
before GHG regulation under the CAA officially began in the
Obama Administration, debate over a GHG NAAQS reached an
apex.301  One is hard pressed, for instance, to find a law review arti-
cle on the anticipated regulation of GHGs under the CAA from this
period that does not first give serious consideration to the NAAQS
program.
Around this time, more than a few respected CAA scholars ar-
gued that, design problems notwithstanding, the EPA Administra-
tor might eventually be forced to list GHGs as a criteria air
pollutant under Chevron step-one.302  This potentiality was based on
the threat posed by climate change and the arguably mandatory
language of section 108303 and was noted in the ANPR.304  The case
most cited by proponents of the mandatory duty argument is the
long-standing 1976 decision of Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Train305 by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  Leading up to the
Train decision, EPA had already made an endangerment finding
for lead under section 212 and had started to promulgate regula-
tions under Title II to eliminate lead as a fuel additive.  EPA con-
ceded that lead met the prerequisites in section 108(a)(1)(A)-(B),
but EPA was hoping to avoid setting a NAAQS for lead and argued
that the Administrator had the discretion not to “plan to issue[ ]
criteria” under section 108(a)(1)(C).  The Second Circuit rejected
this argument outright:
Section 108(a)(1) contains mandatory language. It pro-
vides that ‘the Administrator *shall . . . publish . . . a list
. . . .’ (Emphasis added.) If the EPA interpretation were
accepted and listing were mandatory only for substances
‘for which (the Administrator) plans to issue air quality
criteria . . . ‘, then the mandatory language of [§]
108(a)(1)(A) would become mere surplusage. The deter-
mination to list a pollutant . . . , and the rigid deadlines of
301. See Chettiar & Schwartz, supra note 39, at 144-45 n. 282.
302. For a further discussion of the “Chevron two-step,” see infra Part X.
303. See Richardson, supra note 17, at 289.
304. See ANPR, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,476.
305. See Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 325-26 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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[§] 108(a)(2), [§] 109, and [§] 110 for attaining air qual-
ity standards could be bypassed by him at will.306
The Train decision forced EPA to establish a lead NAAQS
shortly thereafter.  Just as litigation led the Second Circuit to force
EPA to list lead as a criteria air pollutant and thereafter set a lead
NAAQS, so too, scholars have argued, could litigation possibly force
the hand of the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court to mandate
that EPA list GHGs as a collective criteria air pollutant and thereaf-
ter establish a GHG NAAQS.307  Granted, Train now would not even
count as precedent in the D.C. Circuit;308 the decision pre-dated
the statutory interpretation analysis adopted by the Supreme Court
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council;309 and the num-
ber of scholars making this mandatory duty argument has no doubt
dwindled in light of UARG.310  Back in the waning days of the Bush
43 administration and early days of the Obama administration,
however, there was a zenith of debate over whether the EPA Admin-
istrator must list or could list GHGs as a collective criteria air pollu-
tant and thereafter establish a NAAQS for the gases.311
Then, as President Obama took office and began establishing
his administration, debate over a GHG NAAQS began to recede
into the background.  Debate and discussion over the matter then
all but disappeared as the Obama EPA began pursuing a GHG reg-
ulatory policy that relied on other parts of the Act.
D. The Obama EPA’s Initiation of GHG Regulation Under the
CAA
Taking office with a self-proclaimed mandate from the people
to fight climate change, President Obama wasted little time before
directing his first EPA Administrator, Lisa P. Jackson, to move for-
ward with GHG regulation under the Act.  The Obama EPA started
with the 2009 Endangerment Finding,312 then initiated GHG regu-
306. Id. at 324–25. “The structure of  the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970,
its legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the Act leave no room for
an interpretation which makes the issuance of air quality standards for lead under
section 108 discretionary.” Id. at 328.
307. See Richardson, supra note 17, at 285-87; see also McCubbin, supra note 5,
at 452.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (requiring all CAA regulatory challenges be
heard by D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals).
309. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see also infra Part X.
310. See Buzbee, supra note 85, at 72; Hennessee, supra note 37, at 1100.
311. See McCubbin, supra note 5, at 452; see also Richardson, supra note 17, at
284; Chettiar & Schwartz, supra note 39, at 306.
312. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 30, at 66,496.
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lation under Title II and began promulgating GHG regulation
under certain parts of Title I, but it always steered clear of the
NAAQS provisions.
In response to this new regulation, a large number of states led
by Republican governors, as well as the Chambers of Commerce,
various industry groups, and free-enterprise think tanks filed law-
suits challenging the GHG regulation.313  Other states led by Demo-
cratic governors and various environmental groups joined in the
defense of EPA in these lawsuits,314 and many environmental and a
good number of business groups rallied to defend EPA in the
courts of public opinion.  But no state or environmental group ever
brought a lawsuit against EPA calling for a GHG NAAQS like Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, and Maine had done briefly in 2003.  Most
environmentally progressive leaders and environmentalist groups
seemed to have had their hands full defending the President’s cli-
mate policy from incessant attack and were not interested in trying
to force EPA down a completely different and possibly perilous reg-
ulatory path.  There was one exception though early on.  In 2009,
two environmentalist groups had the gall, or courage depending on
one’s perspective, to petition EPA to establish a GHG NAAQS.315
E. A Preposterous Petition for a Primary NAAQS for GHGs—
Ignored for a Reason
The one and only petition calling for the establishment of a
GHG NAAQS was filed in late 2009 by attorneys for 350.org and the
Center for Biological Diversity.316
The petition, which has yet to be answered, calls for the estab-
lishment of a Primary GHG NAAQS of 350 CO2 ppm.317  While its
authors cite the scientific literature on atmospheric CO2 and pro-
jected climate impacts by the IPCC, they fail to confront the fact
that their proposed regulation would cause nationwide nonattain-
313. See Leslie Kaufman, A Surge in Lawsuits Challenging EPA on Climate, N.Y.
TIMES: GREEN (Nov. 3, 2010, 2:10 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/
03/a-surge-in-lawsuits-challenges-e-p-a-on-climate/.
314. See John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/energy-environment/
27lawsuits.html.
315. See Ctr. Biological Diversity & 350.org, Petition to Establish National Pol-
lution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warm
ing_litigation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf
(last visited Jul. 21, 2019).
316. Id. at 23-24 (“Petitioners request both a primary and secondary national
pollution limit (NAAQS) of no more than 350 ppm CO2”).
317. Id. at 2.
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ment, with onerous LAER318 and offset requirements for owners
and operators of new or modified major sources319 and impossible
tasks for SIP planners320 lasting well over a hundred years. Global
CO2, which is set to be approximately 409 ppm in 2019 according
to Mauna Loa,321 will continue to rise over the next two decades
even if the entire global community were to immediately imple-
ment the boldest climate change mitigation policies conceived by
scientists and experts.322  Destroying every fossil fuel-fired power
plant, every cement, concrete, and steel plant, and every internal-
combustion-engine on earth would not be enough to attain a Pri-
mary NAAQS of 350 ppm by its statutory deadline.  Suffice to say, if
such a proposed Primary GHG NAAQS were to somehow survive
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court and be implemented, it would
wreck the U.S. economy.  But such regulation would never pass
muster with the Court, because whatever Congress intended when
it passed and twice amended the Clean Air Act, it did not include
the nation committing economic seppuku in a futile attempt to
achieve impossible climate goals.323
Such criticism was seldom heard, however, as EPA ignored the
petition and so did most everyone else.  The petition never gar-
nered anything close to the level of controversy and press being
generated by, for instance, the recent “Green New Deal” resolution
proposed by Senator Ed Markey and Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez.324  Other environmentalist groups, not wanting to
rock the boat, never joined the petitioners or championed any simi-
318. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (stating that LAER reflects “the most stringent
limitation which is achieved in practice by such class or category of source, which-
ever is more stringent”).
319. See id. § 7503(c)(2012). This provision requires “offsets” for the permit-
ting construction or modification of a major emitting facility in a nonattainment
region. It requires owners and operators to offset their planned source’s emissions
by showing an emissions reduction is being made elsewhere in the region. Id.
320. See Nordhaus, supra note 4, at 62-63, quoting Reitze, supra note 56, at 417.
321. See Up-to-date Weekly Average CO2 at Mauna Loa, NAT. OCEANIC & ATMOS.
ADM., http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/weekly.html (last visited Jul.
27, 2019); NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index, supra note 56.
322. See Piers Forster et al., 2.SM Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C
in the context of sustainable development, Supplementary Material, Ch. 2, 2A-28
Tbl. 2.SM.12, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/11/
sr15_chapter2_supplementary_materials.pdf (finding that scenarios with fifty-five
percent chance of keeping global warming below 1.5°C approximately have a peak
concentration of 423 CO2 ppm in year 2041), supplementing IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra 76, at 99 (paragraph 2.1.3).
323. See Seppuku, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
topic/seppuku (last visited Jul. 21, 2019).
324. See H.R.J. Res. 79, 116th Cong. (2019); see also generally Lisa Friedman,
What Is the Green New Deal? A Climate Proposal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019),
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lar policy.  In fact, one is hard-pressed to find a comment by a main-
stay environmental organization on the petition.  It is almost as if
they preferred that the petition be ignored and forgotten.
One of the authors of the petition, Kassie Siegel, and three
other attorneys at the Center for Biological Diversity have recently
published an update of the petition’s argument.325  The update,
however, does not grasp that even with an “averaging time” for a
Primary GHG NAAQS around or below current levels “span[ning]
decades,” a novel and somewhat confusing concept, the standard
would still be missed, leading once again to nationwide nonattain-
ment.326  As for the petitioners themselves, 350.org and the Center
for Biological Diversity have not followed up with any litigation,
which suggests that they were never really serious about the petition
or have since lost faith in the arguments of their attorneys.
Whatever the case, the petition still sits unanswered at EPA.
F. The Successes and Failures of the Obama EPA in the Fight
Against Climate Change
Overall, what the Obama administration achieved in the fight
against climate change was significant but limited.  In terms of pre-
cedent, the Obama EPA did establish, indirectly, the foundation for
all GHG regulation under the CAA with its 2009 Endangerment
Finding; and the central conclusion of this finding—that GHG
emissions causing climate change pose a danger—could never be
easily challenged given the mountain of scientific evidence that
EPA brought to bear to support the finding.327  After President
Obama took an active role in negotiations with automakers, the
Obama EPA then established GHG regulation of cars and trucks
under Title II and the long-standing federal statute governing “Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy” (CAFE) standards.”328  Later in
President Obama’s second term, EPA established new source per-
formance standards (NSPS) under section 111(b) for newly con-
structed, fossil-fuel fired power plants.329  The Obama EPA also
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/green-new-deal-questions-answers.
html.
325. Crystal & Siegel et al., supra note 44, at 233.
326. Id. at 265-66.
327. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 30, at 66,537.
328. See Tailpipe Rule, supra note 22, at 25,324; see also Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 2(1)-(5), 89 Stat. 874 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2012)).
329. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units;
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015).
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managed to establish PSD and Title V permitting regulations for
stationary sources of GHGs already regulated by those programs
without things getting out of control, though this was in no thanks
to EPA’s own legal arguments.330  Some of the Obama officials’ ar-
guments in pursuit of GHG regulation under the CAA were quite
bad, with the “tailoring” part of the Tailoring Rule being a repug-
nant example.331  Though all in all, the Obama EPA can claim the
2009 Endangerment Finding and GHG regulation under Title II
and NSPS as victories on the domestic front, as well as achieving
more-or-less what the President intended with the PSD and Title V
regulation of large sources of GHGs.  But the Obama EPA blun-
dered with regard to the Administration’s most ambitious climate
regulation, the Clean Power Plan (CPP),332 which the Supreme
Court stayed in its entirety just two months after the historic Paris
Climate Agreement.333
Promulgated with much fan-fare and billed as the grand culmi-
nation of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, the Clean Power
Plan is based on the seldom-used section 111(d), which grants EPA
the authority to establish existing source performance standards for
certain categories of large industrial sources.334  Through the CPP,
the Obama EPA tried to use this authority to not only establish
heat-improvement rates in coal- and natural gas-fired power plants
(building block 1) but also mandate increased levels of renewable
energy generation for individual states (building block 3).335  Re-
garding building block 3, the Obama EPA made an expansive claim
of authority based on a creative interpretation of section 111(d)’s
“best system of emissions reduction” that seems to go far beyond
the authority granted by that section’s text.336  Attorneys and com-
mentators for the mainstay environmentalist groups nevertheless
praised the CPP after its promulgation, though the basis for this
praise was likely more for what the CPP intended to accomplish
330. See Buzbee, supra note 85, at 67.
331. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at 31,567.
332. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,663 (October
23, 2015) (known as “Clean Power Plan” or “CPP”).
333. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.) (staying
CPP in entirety until full review by Court).  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan dissented. Id.
334. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
335. See generally James E. McCarthy, Jonathan L. Ramseur et. al., EPA’s Clean
Power Plan for Existing Power Plants: Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Re-
search Service, at 16-17 (December 19, 2017), http://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R44341.
336. See CPP, supra note 333, at 64,626.
54
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol31/iss1/1
2019] WE CAN FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE WITH THE ARMY WE HAVE 55
than for its solid legal foundation.  At any rate, the CPP propo-
nents’ hopes were somewhat dashed when the Supreme Court is-
sued its stay and then all but crushed by the election of President
Donald J. Trump.
Just recently, the Trump EPA finalized a rule that attempts to
replace the stayed-CPP with the “Affordable Clean Energy” rule.337
This rule confines the “best system of emission reduction” to a
power plant’s heat-rate efficiency rate (basically building block 1
only) and provides States with a list of emissions control technology
in this regard, leaving it to individual states to come up with a “stan-
dard appropriately tailored to each existing source.”338  As reported
by the New York Times, “[t]he move largely gives states the author-
ity to decide how far to scale back emissions, or not to do it all, and
significantly reduces the federal government’s role in setting stan-
dards.”339  Now that the Trump EPA has promulgated a replace-
ment rule, “industry groups and red states have asked a federal
appellate court to dismiss litigation over the CPP.”340
The Supreme Court rarely issues stays of finalized rules, and
only does so when there is, among other things, “a fair prospect
that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse a judgment be-
low.”341  Thus, in the unlikely event that the CPP, now stayed and
abandoned, ever goes before the Court for a full review, I will wager
that only a shell of its former self will survive intact.
Domestically, the stay of the CPP appears to be a crushing de-
feat for President Obama’s legacy on climate change.  Though iron-
ically, on the international front, before the stay, the CPP served as
key leverage in President Obama and Secretary of State John
Kerry’s negotiations with other world leaders leading up to the suc-
cessful Paris Climate Agreement in late 2015.342  That is, the CPP
leant credibility to the United States’ commitment and resolve on
cutting GHG emissions and assisted the President in getting rela-
337. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emis-
sion Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).
338. Id. at 32,550.
339. Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Finalizes Its Plan to Replace Obama-Era Climate Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/climate/epa-
coal-emissions.html.
340. Pamela King, Opponents Ask to Drop D.C. Circuit Challenge, E&E NEWS (July
16, 2019), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060747661/.
341. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010).
342. William Brangham, Will a Surprising Supreme Court Move Shake the Paris
Climate Accord?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:22 PM) http://www.pbs.org/new-
shour/bb/will-a-surprising-supreme-court-move-shake-the-paris-climate-accord/
(statement of Coral Davenport of New York Times).
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tively comparable emissions-reduction pledges from the heads-of-
state of other countries, such as China’s Xi Jinping, which was cru-
cial to the success in Paris.343  The Paris Agreement is, of course,
not a treaty, is entirely aspirational, calls for modest reductions as a
whole, and has no enforcement mechanism other than perhaps so-
cial stigma among world leaders;344 but it is nonetheless an unprec-
edented achievement, major milestone, and an important
statement of worldwide solidarity to fight climate change.345
G. Lessons and Takeaways from Paris and the Now-Stayed and
Likely-Doomed Clean Power Plan
Of course, President Trump has derided the Paris Agreement
and often goes about loudly declaring his intention to formally re-
nege on the promise his predecessor made regarding emissions re-
ductions—to “cancel” the Agreement in his words.346  Though
despite the sudden exit of U.S. leadership and commitment, much
of the rest of the world seems to be attempting to carry out the
modest reductions that their heads of state or representatives
thereof promised in Paris in late 2015.347  President Obama’s use of
the CPP can be partially attributed to that success, along with such
things as European commitment, a not insignificant pledge by Xi
Jinping for China, the vocal advocacy of nations whose very exis-
tence is threated by climate change, and French diplomacy in
Paris.348
The Paris Climate Agreement and the pre-stay CPP can be criti-
cized, however, for not being ambitious enough.  Even if both were
fully implemented, the emission reductions garnered would—on
the international and domestic fronts, respectively—fall far short of
343. Id.
344. See, e.g., Simon Denyer & Brady Dennis, As G-20 Reaffirms Fight Against
Climate Change, Trump Stands Apart, WASH. POST (June 29, 2019), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/climate-environment/as-g-20-reaffirms-fight-against-climate-
change-trump-again-stands-apart/2019/06/29/d3d96f22-9a68-11e9-830a-21b9b36
b64ad_story.html.
345. Id.
346. See, e.g., Louis Jacobson, Trump-O-Meter: Cancel the Paris Climate Agreement,
POLITIFACT (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/
trumpometer/promise/1379/cancel-paris-climate-agreement/ (providing Presi-
dent Trump’s statements regarding Paris Agreement). “We’re going to cancel the
Paris Climate Agreement and stop all payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N. global
warming programs.” Id.
347. Coral Davenport, A Climate Deal, 6 Fateful Years in the Making, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/world/europe/a-climate-
deal-6-fateful-years-in-the-making.html.
348. Id.
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what is necessary to avert what reasonable people would call cata-
strophic climate change.349  At any rate, unlike the Paris Climate
Agreement, the CPP is likely doomed.
Looking back, one could view the CPP as an illustration of
both the success and failure of the Obama Administration in the
fight against climate change; an example of how ambition in a U.S.
domestic climate policy can influence worldwide events; and, with
regard to its now all-but-certain demise, a cautionary tale of why
EPA should be wary of grabbing more authority than the Act’s text
seems to grant. This last lesson—that EPA should only claim au-
thority clearly granted by the Act’s text and nothing more—is per-
haps most instructive moving forward.
VIII. WAS PRESIDENT OBAMA TRYING TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE
WITH THE ARMY HE WISHED HE HAD?
In 2004, early on in the Iraq War, a young soldier preparing to
deploy once asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a ques-
tion-and-answer session why he and his fellow soldiers had to dig
through local landfills to equip their vehicles with make-shift armor
to protect themselves against the increasingly deadly roadside
bombs being laid by the enemy in Iraq.  Rumsfeld’s answer to the
young cavalryman drew some ire, but it is instructive here: “You go
to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish
to have at a later time.”350
Looking back, was President Obama trying to fight climate
change with the army he wished he had?  And if so, is the NAAQS
program the army we have?  When it comes to regulating GHGs to
protect public health or welfare against climate change, the NAAQS
program does seem to be the only CAA program that the Obama
EPA did not try.351  I argue that the NAAQS program is indeed “the
army [we] have” and that it is far more powerful and flexible than
people realize.
349. See DOE’s International Energy Outlook 2016, supra note 124, at 143
table 9-2 (noting that implementation of CPP is expected to decrease global GHG
emissions by 0.2 percent over the 2012-2040 timeframe).
350. Eric Schmitt, Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld Over Lack of Armor, N.Y.
TIMES, (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/mid
dleeast/iraqbound-troops-confront-rumsfeld-over-lack-of.html.
351. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
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IX. SOLVING THE DESIGN PROBLEM WITH A SECONDARY NAAQS OF
350 PPM CO2/CO2EQ BY 2351 BASED ON RCP 3PD AND THE
GOAL OF <2°C GLOBAL WARMING BY 2100
A. A Secondary NAAQS of 350 ppm CO2/CO2eq by 2351 Is
Ambitious
The NAAQS program can work as designed for GHGs and the
protection of public welfare, because States can develop and imple-
ment SIPs that, but for international emissions, would achieve a
Secondary NAAQS of 350 ppm of CO2eq by year 2351.
1. On Year 2351
Some environmentalists might initially balk and critics chuckle
at an attainment date set in the same century as the science-fiction
television series, Star Trek Next Generation,352 but achieving this goal
would require all nations of the world to immediately begin reduc-
ing emissions on par with one of the most ambitious climate change
mitigation scenarios developed by climate scientists—RCP 3PD.353
In short, this NAAQS target affords both ambition and time.
Though, from an environmentalist’s perspective, there is not much
of a margin for safety here. On the other hand, from a capitalist
and realist’s standpoint, I do not see a more ambitious policy, like
one giving us a more-likely-than-not chance of limiting global warm-
ing to 1.5°C by 2100, as feasible.354
2. Marrying the 350 ppm Target with the International Goal of
<2°C Global Warming by 2100
If humanity immediately began reducing emissions in line with
RCP 3PD (on track to achieve 350 ppm by 2351) upon the publish-
ing of the IPCC AR5 back in 2014 and maintained reductions on
par with RCP 3PD thereafter, we would barely have a more-likely-
than-not chance (≈50.01 percent) of limiting man-made global
352. STAR TREK NEXT GENERATION (CBS television series 1987-1994).
353. Meinshausen et al., supra note 59, at 232 fig. 5.  It is from the trajectory
and decline of global CO2/CO2eq in RCP 3PD that I calculated 350 ppm CO2eq/
CO2 by 2351.  From the IPCC’s 2014 Report, I conclude that if the U.S. and other
countries were to ultimately bend down the trajectory of global CO2/CO2eq
equivalent to that of RPC 3PD, or perhaps an updated version of RPC-3PD, we will
have indeed averted dangerous climate change.
354. Cf. Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C, supra note 323, at 2A-28
Tbl. 2.SM.12, supplementing IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 76,
at 112.
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warming to 2°C.355  The goal of keeping global warming below 2°C
has been lauded internationally,356 and 2°C seems as good of a
threshold for dangerous climate change as any,357 but only a few
countries are doing their part to achieve it at this time.358  That
would likely change, however, if EPA were to establish a Secondary
GHG NAAQS of 350 ppm by 2351 or one based on an updated RPC
3PD.
Re-calculating an exact target that would, at this time, still give
us a 50.01 percent chance of preventing 2°C of global warming by
2100 is beyond my capability, but if the concentration target re-
mains 350 ppm—a concentration that many scientists regard as
“safe” over the long-term359—the attainment date should still sit
somewhere in the early 24th Century based on the 2014 IPCC Re-
port and analysis by the Potsdam Institute.360
At any rate, the number of nations committed to the path of
<2°C would likely increase substantially if the U.S. were to adopt a
355. See RCP subcategory titled “Exceedance of 530 ppm CO2 eq,” found in
IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AR5, supra note 59, at 431, Table 6.
(showing “39-61%” probability of exceeding 2°C).  The IPCC reports provide little
data beyond 2100, so for long-term CO2/CO2eq concentrations and the emissions
reductions attendant to this pathway, I turned to Meinshausen et al., supra note 59,
and the data-runs that the authors used to support their paper. See RCP Concentra-
tion Calculations and Data, Final Version, background data, acknowledgments, and further
info, POTSDAM INST. FOR CLIMATE RESEARCH, http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte
/rcps/ (last visited July 19, 2019).  Based on these data-runs, RCP 3PD has human-
ity achieving “net zero” in year 2072 and bringing global CO2 and CO2eq back
down to 350.0356 ppm and 350.9814 ppm, respectively, in year 2351.  My nineteen
percent reduction per decade is an approximate, straight-line reduction to net
zero in 2072 from present time.
356. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 250, at 5; Paris Agreement, supra
note 252, at 22.
357. See, e.g., John Nielsen-Gammon, Remarks at UNIV. OF HOUSTON ENERGY
SYMPOSIUM SERIES: CLIMATE CHANGE, IS IT A REAL THREAT? (Feb. 11, 2014), available
at https://youtu.be/U-CiGxAlGG4 (38:44).  “[T]he last time the earth was mostly
ice free was about 125,000 years ago, and we were about 1 to 2 °C warmer on
average around the globe; and there were not massive extinctions and . . . massive
releases of methane hydrates or other possible wild cards in the climate system.  So
the reason that 2°C of warming has sort of been established as a maximum target is
not because we know there are going to be many bad consequences, but it is really
beyond the point that we know there is not going to be many bad consequences. . .
The unexplored territory represents a risk that is very difficult to quantify.” Id.
358. See generally Emissions Gap Report 2018, Executive Summary, UN ENVIRON-
MENT PROGRAMME (NOV. 2018), http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/
20.500.11822/26879/EGR2018_ESEN.pdf.
359. See, e.g., James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Re-
quired Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and
Nature, 8 PLOS ONE 12 (Dec. 3, 2013), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article
?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0081648. The 350 ppm concentration target has its own
name recognition thanks to the advocacy of Dr. James Hansen and 350.org.
360. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
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long-range Secondary NAAQS of 350 CO2/CO2eq ppm with an at-
tainment date set in the early 24th Century, because if other na-
tions were to not join this effort, then all of the NAAQS regulation
would increasingly become disadvantageous economically and ar-
guably futile.361  Suffice to say, the U.S. would have a powerful in-
centive to get other nations on board.
The domestic struggle to meet emission-reduction milestones
each decade through SIPs and the international struggle to get
other nations to reduce in-kind would be an unprecedented chal-
lenge for the nation.  Effectively mitigating climate change stands
to be the great challenge for the world this century and perhaps the
Millennium.  Academics and activists have compared the task to
that of a medieval town constructing a grand cathedral over multi-
ple generations.362  That is, the project will take immense resources
and effort and not be finished for hundreds of years; work on the
foundation (e.g., initial reductions) might need to proceed before
there’s even a plan for the roof (e.g., post-net zero); however, we
should proceed anyway with faith and for the glory of God.363  Ex-
cept, whereas a cathedral’s construction in medieval times required
the work, commitment, and faith of a town or region over many
generations, the mitigation of human-made climate change re-
quires the multi-generational commitment and participation of
practically every nation on earth.364  Is the United States, the indis-
pensable leader of the free world, up to this challenge?
The United States is innovative and has immense wealth,
power, military might, and economic influence.  Also, it could likely
count Europe, Pacific nations, and other countries as initial allies
on this front.  Perhaps, as Winston Churchill was once attributed to
say, “Americans can be counted on to do the right thing, now that
[we] have exhausted every other alternative.”365
361. See ANPR (response by Dept. of Commerce), supra note 140 and accom-
panying text, at 44,375.
362. Interview with Anthony Leiserowitz, Dir. of the Yale Program on Climate
Change Comm. (July 24, 2019); Sam Knight, The Uncanny Power of Greta Thunberg’s
Climate-Change Rhetoric, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 24, 2019), http://www.newyorker.
com/news/daily-comment/the-uncanny-power-of-greta-thunbergs-climate-change-
rhetoric.
363. See Genesis 2:15, King James Version (stating, “And the  LORD God took
the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it.”).
364. See generally supra note 354 and accompanying text.
365. Harvard School Bulletin, The New York Club’s International Dinner, HARV.
UNIV. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. 91, 92 (July/Aug. 1980) (quoted by Clifton Garvin,
Jr., purportedly).
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But even if most other countries drag their feet for a few de-
cades and get behind on emissions reductions, it should not pre-
vent the U.S. and its allies from doing their part to achieve a
climate mitigation scenario akin to RPC 3PD, as new technology
could fill the gap in the 11th hour.  “Necessity is the mother of
innovation”366 after all, and we will never protect the welfare of this
generation or future generations from man-made global warming
and ocean acidification if we do not try.  Furthermore, the CAA
does not require that a state or the United States solve a global
criteria-air-pollution problem on its own.  Rather, the “but for [in-
ternational] emissions” provision of section 179B requires that each
State do its part,367 which is what this regulation would accomplish
if implemented.
B. A Secondary NAAQS of 350 ppm CO2/CO2eq by 2351 Is
Arguably Realistic
The U.S. emissions reduction called for by a Secondary
NAAQS of 350 ppm CO2/CO2eq by 2351 is arguably realistic.
Achieving emissions-reduction milestones would be difficult, but
the milestones for the first thirty years are definitely in the realm of
possible.  The policy stands in stark contrast, for instance, to the
immediate decarbonization seemingly called for by the Green New
Deal368 or any previously proposed Primary GHG NAAQS for that
matter, either of which would cripple the U.S. economy if imple-
mented.369  This brings us to the subject of “net zero emissions.”
“Net zero emissions” is a key, long-term climate goal under any
ambitious climate policy and is a good measuring stick for judging
the feasibility, ambition, and cost of various climate policies.  “Net
zero emissions” means the amount of CO2eq emitted must not ex-
ceed the amount of CO2eq being taken in by anthropogenic sinks,
so that humanity’s addition of atmospheric CO2eq is a net zero,
with natural sinks such as plants and the ocean slowly working their
effect to reduce global CO2 over the long-term.370  In a post-net
zero world, if humans were to continue emitting CO2 from, for in-
366. See Plato, III PLATO’S REPUBLIC: THE GREEK TEXT 369c (Benjamin Jowett
trans. 1894) (translating Plato, with some flourish, as “the true creator is necessity,
who is the mother of our invention”).
367. 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(a) (2012).
368. See Friedman, supra note 325.
369. See generally Doug Holtz-Eakin, How Much Will the Green New Deal Cost?,
THE ASPEN INST. (June 11, 2019), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/how-
much-will-the-green-new-deal-cost/.
370. See IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 76, at 555, Annex
I (glossary).
61
Quirke: We Can Fight Climate Change with the Army We Have
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
62 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31: p. 1
stance, jet travel and some industrial processes, these emissions
would have to be offset by planting more trees or perhaps some
kind of “bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage
(BECCS)”371 system that literally takes CO2 out of the air and se-
questers it into the earth.
Again, achieving ”net zero” emissions seems inconceivable in
our current, fossil-fuel dependent global economy, but an approxi-
mate sixty percent reduction in CO2/CO2eq emissions over the
next thirty years definitely seems “doable.”372
1. On Cost and Renewable Energy, Nuclear Energy, Carbon
Capture Sequestration, Bioenergy with Carbon Capture
and Storage, or Whatever Works
As for cost, fighting climate change, like fighting any war, will
take a war chest, but a sixty percent reduction of U.S. emissions
over the next thirty years need not impair the U.S. economy if pur-
sued in a smart manner.  Perhaps the rapid development of carbon
capture storage (CCS)—on a scale that far surpasses all the hori-
zontal-drilling and hydraulic-fracturing of the last oil boom—could
garner a sixty percent thirty years in the U.S. and be steadily
deployed worldwide.373  The piping industry, petroleum engineers,
and coal miners all stand to benefit from a CCS-centric policy.  Al-
ternatively, renewables and changes to the energy grid to fully cap-
ture and transfer renewable energy quickly may achieve a sixty
percent reduction,374 and a steady transition from gasoline-pow-
ered vehicles to mostly electric vehicles could conceivably achieve
further reductions thereafter.375  As for beyond 2050, technological
developments are unpredictable.  High speed trains or Elon Musk’s
“hyperloop” might have the potential to replace much of our jet
travel.376  There also may be hope in BECCS or large industrial de-
vices, perhaps powered by nuclear energy, removing massive quan-
tities of CO2 out of the air and pumping the CO2 back into the
371. Id.
372. Cf. Gold, supra note 253 (quoting Aaron Bloom of Dept. of Energy as
stating that a thirty percent reduction by 2030 solely from a new overlay of trans-
mission lines is “doable”).
373. See, e.g., IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AR5, supra note 59, at
119 (stating “CCS has figured prominently in many studies that look at the poten-
tial for large cuts in global emissions”).
374. See MacDonald et al., supra note 253.
375. See IPCC, 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AR5, supra note 59, at 74.
376. See generally Hyperloop, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/hyperloop (last
visited Jul. 29, 2019).
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earth from whence it came.377  Humans have genetically modified
chicken and salmon to grow larger; perhaps we could do the same
with trees?378  The point is, human beings can be quite innovative
when money and high stakes are on the line—“where there’s a will,
there’s a way”—and whatever ways that ultimately reduce global
CO2/CO2eq to protect public welfare will work.379
2. On Vested Interests and the Fossil Fuel Reserves
Speaking of money, Americans owning oil-and-gas interests,
those working in the fossil-fuel industry, and states with fossil-fuel
extraction on public lands—not to mention many international
workers and foreign nations—all stand to lose a significant portion
of their wealth from a renewables-only or nuclear-only policy that
the U.S. dictates from upon high.380  The economic wealth tied up
in domestic and foreign reserves would, for instance, be signifi-
cantly reduced by something akin to the Green New Deal.381
Frankly, the global adoption of any “keep it in the ground” policy
would effectively destroy the value of fossil-fuel reserves.382
In contrast, a long-term Secondary GHG NAAQS of 350 ppm
CO2/CO2eq by 2351 or some similar target, coupled with interna-
tional solidarity, would generally allow coal and natural gas power
plants across the world to continue operating until the end of their
useful economic lives.383  Upon their retirement, these coal and
377. See, e.g., How CO2 Could Be the Future of Fuel — Vice on HBO, VICE NEWS
(Sept. 13, 2018), available at  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mb_8DJF6Hp0.
378. See Anajana Ahuja, Are These the Chickens of the Future?, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/863e034e-d5c8-11e5-829b-8564e
7528e54.
379. Where there’s a will there’s a way, GRAMMARIST, http://grammarist.com/
proverb/where-theres-a-will-theres-a-way/ (last visited July 31, 2019). See IPCC,
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5, supra note 15, at 4-6 (discussing role of carbon diox-
ide and other greenhouse gases in increasing temperature).
380. See Stephen Russell, Fossil Fuels – What’s at Risk?, WORLD RESOURCES INST.
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/02/fossil-fuels-whats-risk (explain-
ing global warming’s potential role in influencing investor profits and climate-re-
lated risks).
381. See id. (discussing impact of policies on investor profits); Sanya Carley &
David Konisky, What Would the Green New Deal Mean for Businesses?, HARVARD BUSI-
NESS REVIEW (Feb. 28, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/what-would-the-green-new-
deal-mean-for-businesses (analyzing effect of Green New Deal on regions that rely
on reserves).
382. See Jeff Brady, ‘Keep It In The Ground’ Activists Optimistic Despite Oil Boom,
NPR (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.npr.org/2018/03/16/589908135/keep-it-in-the-
ground-activists-optimistic-despite-oil-boom; Russell, supra note 381 (stating largest
public companies with fossil fuel reserves currently have more reserves than 2°C
goal permits).
383. See Jeffrey Logan et al., Electricity Generation Baseline Report, NAT. RENEWA-
BLE ENERGY LABORATORY xiv (Jan. 2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/
63
Quirke: We Can Fight Climate Change with the Army We Have
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
64 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31: p. 1
natural gas power plants would then be replaced with something
that is CCS, nuclear, or renewable.384  Perhaps some plants would
need to shut down prematurely, but in the U.S., it would be an
economic decision primarily at the state level through SIPs.385
Turning to history, perhaps the long struggle to rid the United
States of that most “peculiar institution,” slavery, and its successor
in the South, Jim Crow, offers some lessons here.386  As morally rep-
rehensible as slavery was, it did not end because white slave-owners
in the South suddenly realized the wickedness of their ways and
freed their human chattels.387  Rather, white southerners fought
long and hard to preserve the moral sin and economic benefit of
enslaving others, not paying for their labor, and continually op-
pressing them to maintain the arrangement.388  As historian Steven
Deyle writes, “[B]y 1860, slave property had even surpassed the as-
sessed value of real estate within the slaveholding states.”389
As we know, slavery officially ended in the U.S. with the Thir-
teenth Amendment following President Abraham Lincoln’s Eman-
cipation Proclamation, but it took the nation waging the bloodiest
war in its history, on itself, to get to this point.390  The end of the
institution of slavery, however, was still not enough to make African
Americans truly free.391  After a brief period of Reconstruction, sys-
temic oppression of Black Americans in the South and in other ar-
eas returned in the form of Jim Crow, a sometimes official but
mostly unofficial system of racial segregation, oppression, and ter-
67645.pdf (stating coal units retired in 2015 had an average age of fifty-four years
and existing coal units have average age of thirty-eight years).
384. See id. (noting rapid expansion of wind and solar power).
385. See Inara Scott, Teaching An Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility Com-
missions To Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371,
401-404 (2014) (promoting use of state public utility commissions to combat cli-
mate change).
386. John C. Calhoun, The Southern Address, CHARLESTON COURIER (Feb. 1,
1849), http://www.civilwarcauses.org/address.htm.
387. See Frederick Douglass, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS 328-
32 (Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1962) (1881) (detailing resurgence of pro-slavery senti-
ment on eve of American Civil War).
388. See Steven Deyle, CARRY ME BACK: THE DOMESTIC SLAVE TRADE IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE 60 (stating potential loss of slavery led many slaveowners to opt for seces-
sion); see also LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON, Act II (2015) (rapping, “hey
neighbor, your debts are paid, ‘cause you don’t pay for labor”).
389. See Deyle, supra note 389, at 60.
390. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (Jan. 1,
1863). See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM at 545, 860-62 (C. Vann
Woodward ed., 1st ed. 1988) (describing results of American Civil War and free-
dom of slaves).
391. See id. at 862  (hinting that newly-freed slaves did not gain effective
freedom).
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ror.392  It took the non-violent Civil Rights Movement, the leader-
ship of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (MLK), and the federal Civil
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 to ulti-
mately defeat Jim Crow.393  Yet, for all the sympathy and political
will generated by the student sits-ins, freedom riders, bus boycotts,
attacks of nonviolent protesters, and soaring rhetoric of MLK, Civil
Rights legislation was not passed because the U.S. Senate’s “South-
ern bloc,” led by the powerful Senator Richard Brevard Russell, sud-
denly saw the light and dropped their opposition.394  Rather,
Congress passed legislation because then-Senator Lyndon B. John-
son (LBJ)—“a man who had never before fought in [the Civil
Rights] cause”—seized the political capital of the Civil Rights Move-
ment, flipped on “the Southern bloc,” and rammed legislation
through Congress as only the last “Master of the Senate” could.395
The Voting Rights of Act 1965, passed when LBJ was President, was
the crescendo of this struggle.396
Climate environmentalists in the U.S. do not have an LBJ on
their side, but they might not need an LBJ, because they might al-
ready have the law to achieve their objectives.397  But whoever
thinks the millions of Americans owning interests in fossil fuels or
working in the fossil fuel industry will stand aside and see their
wealth and livelihoods threatened or eviscerated is, I argue, as naive
as an abolitionist in the early 19th Century thinking that white plan-
tation owners will someday willingly free their slaves from
bondage.398
To avoid any misunderstandings, I am not equating emitting
CO2 with owning slaves.  We all emit CO2.  Nor am I advocating for
the ceasing of burning all fossil fuels.  I believe there is great poten-
tial with CCS and BECCS.  I am, however, comparing the economic
value of the labor of slaves pre-Civil War, which slaveowners were
392. See Robert A. Caro, MASTER OF THE SENATE 685-92 (2002) (discussing
discrimination Black Americans faced in south for 100 years following civil war).
393. See id. at xxiii-xxiv (explaining impact of Civil Rights legislation on per-
sonal and political lives of Black Americans).
394. See id. at 796-98 (discussing persistent southern opposition in face of
1960s civil rights legislation).
395. See id. at xxiv (discussing Johnson’s seemingly unexpected political push
to pass Civil Rights legislation).
396. See id. at xxiii-xxiv (extolling Civil Rights legislation that Congress passed
during Johnson’s presidency).
397. See ANPR, supra note 43, at 44,481-82; id. supra notes 134, 137, 298-99
and accompanying text.
398. See Deyle, supra note 389, at 60 (noting massive wealth tied up in slave
property).
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loath to give up without a fight, to the wealth tied up in the fossil
fuel reserves.399
Regarding foreign fossil-fuel reserves, much of the future
wealth of countries like Russia and Nigeria, much of the hope for a
better economic future in Venezuela, Iran, and Libya, and the con-
tinued wealth and power of a country like Saudi Arabia are all tied
up in their respective petroleum reserves.400  Again, if the U.S. and
most other countries were to adopt and implement policies that
prohibit the burning of fossil fuels for energy—no matter if the
emissions are captured and sequestered—it would devastate the
value of foreign fossil fuel reserves, which currently runs in the tens
of trillions of dollars.401  Do you, dear reader, think these fossil-fuel
producing countries will ‘do the right thing,’ as some environmen-
talists see it, and choose to leave wealth in the ground?402
Furthermore, if either the Green New Deal or a Primary GHG
NAAQS of 350 ppm were actually implemented, it would effectively
require the shut-down of every coal or natural gas power plant in
the U.S. within a decade or so, if not immediately.  This would qual-
ify as a Constitutional taking requiring compensation.403 Millions of
Americans would also need to relinquish their beloved trucks and
SUVs, which would result in more Constitutional takings. If serious-
minded people think either policy is feasible, they should then con-
sider the ramifications of global implementation.404  Without time
for CCS and BECCS to be tested, developed, and implemented
worldwide, either policy would devastate the value of foreign fossil
fuel reserves.405  Proposing that nations adopt policies that eviscer-
399. Id. (noting immense value held in slavery contributed to southern States’
choice to secede).
400. See Crude Oil Proved Reserves - 2018, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2019) (showing fossil fuel
production and reserves of various countries through interactive map).
401. See e.g., id. (estimating Venezuela’s crude oil proved reserves at 302 bil-
lion barrels); Markets - Energy, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/energy
(last visited Sept. 21, 2019) (stating price of oil as $58.09 or $64.28).
402. See Int’l Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?c=4100000002000060
000000000000g000200000000000000001&vs=INTL.44-1-AFRC-QBTU.A&vo=0&v=
H&start=1980&end=2016 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (displaying massive reserves
countries hold).
403. U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring government to compensate citizens
when it takes private property for public use).
404. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION supra note 403 (displaying
massive reserves and wealth countries possess in the form of crude oil).
405. See id.; David Hone, What Can Really Be Done by 2050?, CLIMATE CHANGE
NAT. FORUM (Feb. 15, 2015), http://climatechangenationalforum.org/by2050/
(drawing comparison with internet and noting IT industry needed fifty years from
time of ARPANET in 1969 to extensively deploy internet).
66
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol31/iss1/1
2019] WE CAN FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE WITH THE ARMY WE HAVE 67
ate their continued or future wealth is not an advisable strategy to
get those same nations to voluntarily reduce their GHG
emissions.406
Bottom-line, the long-range Secondary GHG NAAQS regime
proposed by this paper accounts for these dynamics and economic
realities.407  Existing coal and natural power plants in the U.S. could
live out their economically useful lives and then be replaced with
something that is CCS, nuclear, or renewable.408  Americans could
still drive gasoline-guzzling vehicles until electric trucks and SUVs
become competitive and desirable.409  They could even go through
a couple more “gas-guzzlers” perhaps, so long as their states ac-
count for these emissions.410  Fossil fuel reserves would retain value,
for humans could continue burning all the fossil fuels they want so
long as the GHG emissions are captured and sequestered.411  Most
importantly, unlike the wild-eyed proposals being proposed re-
cently, a Secondary GHG NAAQS would afford time for new policy
implementations nationally and internationally, time for technol-
ogy and market mechanisms to be developed and work their effect,
and time for the U.S. and rest of the world to figure out how to
achieve net zero closer to the turn of the Century.412
As for the good climate polices out there, such as a carbon
price, such proposed legislation unfortunately does not stand a
chance of becoming law so long as Congress and the nation remain
politically divided on climate change, and EPA abstains from using
the most powerful provisions of the CAA.413  Not unlike “the South-
406. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 403 (display-
ing massive reserves and wealth countries possess in form of crude oil).
407. See supra Part IX.B.1 (discussing feasibility of Secondary NAAQS of 350
ppm CO2/CO2eq by 2351).
408. See Logan et al., supra note 384, at xiv (stating coal units retired in 2015
had average age of fifty-four years and existing coal units have average age of thirty-
eight years).
409. See Giovinazzo, supra note 5, at 107 (noting Congress intended CAA to
spur technological advancement and implementation of cleaner alternatives).
410. Richard S. Townley Sr., Comment, So Much Carbon, So Little Time: State
Options For Effective Regulation of Mobile Source Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, 39 U.
MEM. L. REV. 193, 205 (describing state methods for reducing mobile source car-
bon emissions).
411. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 403 (estimat-
ing worldwide oil reserves at approximately one trillion barrels); Markets - Energy,
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/energy (last visited Sept. 21, 2019)
(stating price of oil as $58.09 or $64.28).
412. See Hone, supra note 249 (stressing importance of time in implementing
carbon emissions policies).
413. See Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2019, H.R. 763, 116th
Cong. (2019) (proposing institution of rising fee on carbon content of fuels with
border-adjustments, rebates for CCS, revenue going to U.S. citizens or lawful re-
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ern bloc” in the 1960s on civil rights, most Republicans in Congress
will not be coming around on climate change any time soon, and
environmentalists do not have an LBJ.414  But what environmental-
ists do have is an army in the Clean Air Act with regard to the Sec-
ondary NAAQS regime, and this army is, again, far more flexible
and powerful than scholars realize for combating climate
change.415
To conclude, if EPA pursued the Secondary GHG NAAQS pro-
posed by this paper, it would mark a new hope for environmental-
ists worldwide.416  The domestic emissions reduction necessary to
achieve a Secondary NAAQS of 350 ppm CO2eq by 2351 would far
surpass what the Obama Administration attempted.417  Conse-
quently, if such regulation is pursued, it would be immediately chal-
lenged; and to be fully implemented, it would need to be upheld by
the Supreme Court.418  This brings us back to charting a course
that manages the thresholds problem, achieves the purpose of the
NAAQS program, and enables the U.S. economy to continue to
grow.419  But first, a note on Chevron is warranted.420
sidents); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791, 115th
Cong. (2018) (proposing same as H.R. 763); Anthony Leiserowitz et al., Politics &
Global Warming, APR. 2019 YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE
MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N 4, http://climatecommunica-
tion.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Politics-Global-Warming-April-
2019b.pdf (describing clear political divides of electorate on global warming); see
also Emily Atkin, It’s Official: Climate Change is Now More Divisive Than Abortion,
THINK PROGRESS (May 27, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/its-official-climate-
change-is-now-more-divisive-than-abortion-54a69e1898a8/ (declaring global warm-
ing as the most divisive national issue at that time).
414. Leiserowitz et al., supra note 414, at 4 (describing clear political divides
of electorate on global warming).
415. See ANPR, supra note 43, at 44,481-82; id. supra notes 134, 137, 298-99
and accompanying text.
416. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 250, at 5; Paris Agreement, supra
note 252, at 22.
417. See Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power
Plants, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2015), http://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpower-
plan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan.html (expecting approximately thirty-
two percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 based on 2005 levels).
418. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (describ-
ing procedure by which courts review an agency’s interpretation of a statute).
419. See 42 U.S.C.  § 7470(3) (2012) (declaring that one of the  purposes of
PSD program is “to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent
with the preservation of existing clean air resources”).
420. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (granting agency deference when there
is statutory ambiguity).
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X. ON CHEVRON
A. The Chevron Two-Step
In reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, courts use
the “Chevron two-step” analysis the Supreme Court adopted in Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.421, a 1984
case that coincidentally concerned major source regulation under
the CAA.422  Under Chevron step-one, a court must first examine
”whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”423  If so, then both the court and agency must defer to Con-
gressional intent.424
If “Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue” because “the statute is silent or ambiguous,” then the ques-
tion for the court, under Chevron step-two, is “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”425  If
the agency’s resolution of the gap or ambiguous statutory language
is reasonable, the court must defer to the agency because “a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation” by an agency charged with that statute’s
administration.426  Countless papers have been devoted to this rea-
sonableness inquiry, but what appears uncontroverted is that when
an agency’s expertise and a policy decision are called for, Chevron
instructs the courts to defer to the agency unless the agency’s inter-
pretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute.”427  This grant of discretion, known as “Chevron deference,” is
seemingly broad, and it has garnered its share of critics, but it does
have limits.428  As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, “[the] inquiry
requires the agency to give a detailed explanation of its decision by
reference to factors that are relevant under the governing stat-
421. Id. at 837.
422. Id. at 839-41.
423. Id. at 842.
424. Id. at 842-43.
425. Id. at 843.
426. Id. at 844.
427. Id. at 843–44 (1984) (internal citations omitted); see Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
865) (noting “agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron
deference”); Thomas Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J.
833, 861 (2001) (noting that Chevron deference rests largely on premise that Con-
gress prefers discretionary policy choices to be made by “politically accountable”
entities, such as agencies in executive branch, rather than courts).
428. See Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2104–05 (1990) (stating Chevron’s reasonableness requirement requires an
agency to discuss factors relevant in its determination).
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ute.”429  EPA could most definitely do that under the Secondary
NAAQS scheme this paper proposes.430
B. The UARG Court’s Use of and Possible Addition to the
Chevron Analysis
In the UARG opinion, Justice Scalia stated that the Court was
reviewing EPA’s interpretation of the CAA under the Chevron
framework.431  But, as Professor Craig Oren writes in a 2015
Harvard Environmental Law Review symposium432 devoted to the
implications of UARG, rather than discussing steps one and two as
stated in Chevron, “Justice Scalia divide[d] the inquiry into, first,
whether EPA was required to adopt its interpretations of the stat-
ute, and second, whether the statute permitted EPA to do so.”433
This framework was a slight deviation from Chevron’s two steps and
“makes analysis difficult.”434  Nevertheless, this Article attempts an
analysis, often referring to Oren and others’ contributions to this
2015 symposium along the way.
Regarding step one, to the surprise of many, the UARG Court
identified ambiguity in the term “any air pollutant,” finding that
the term, in that instance, could have a narrower construction that
excludes GHGs.435  Again, the Court did not adopt a particular con-
struction but suggested the term could possibly be limited to crite-
ria air pollutants.436  Alternatively, the Court offered that the term
could possibly be limited to those pollutants with “localized effects,”
which would also exclude GHGs.437  EPA was therefore not man-
dated to treat GHGs as “any air pollutant” under Chevron step-one in
this case.438
The reasoning gets murky in step two, but Justice Scalia began
by claiming that “plac[ing] plainly excessive demands on limited
governmental resources is alone a good reason for rejecting . . .”
429. Id.
430. See infra Parts XII and XIII.
431. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 315 (2014).
432. 433 Symposium, Climate Change Regulation Under the Clean Air Act in the
Wake of Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1-63 (2015)
433. Craig N. Oren, UARG – Not a Chef D’Oeuvre of Opinion Writing, 39 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 56 (2015).
434. Id.
435. UARG, 573 U.S. at 320, 320 n.6 (2014).
436. See id. at 320 (stating “any air pollutant” does not compel EPA to regulate
GHGs like atypical pollutants).
437. Id. at 320 n.6.
438. Id. at 320.
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the authority that EPA was claiming.439  One can argue that EPA
was not claiming this authority because EPA was not trying to regu-
late tens of thousands of new sources under PSD and a few million
more under Title V.  But the Court nevertheless found that EPA
was indirectly claiming this authority (and arbitrarily “tailoring” it for
the time being).440  The Court then concluded that requiring PSD
permits from tens of thousands of smaller sources and Title V per-
mits from a few million more is just the kind of regulatory expan-
sion that “we have been reluctant to read into an ambiguous
statutory text.”441  Though, as Professor William Buzbee notes in his
contribution to the symposium, “the majority identifies no
ambiguity.”442
As Professor Buzbee writes, “EPA’s claim of power is called ‘pa-
tently unreasonable’ and ‘outrageous’ while the Court’s contrary
read is ‘plain as day’ . . . . [But] the actual textual basis for the
majority’s rejection of EPA power is merely an inference drawn
from implementation burdens.”443  After focusing on implementa-
tion burdens, Justice Scalia then, as Professor Richard Lazarus
notes, “resurrected” the central relevance of FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson decision.444 Brown & Williamson was a case on the FDA’s
attempted regulation of tobacco products that the Court in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA had previously found inapplicable to the CAA, Laza-
rus notes, and Justice Scalia “thrice quot[ed] from it to make the
point” that, as stated in UARG, “[w]hen an agency claims to dis-
cover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a
significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its
announcement with a measure of skepticism.’”445 “This dictum
seems inconsistent with the protective philosophy behind the
Act[,]” Professor Oren writes; “[a] watchdog such as EPA should
have its authority literally interpreted to ensure that public health
and the environment are protected.”446
All in all, the UARG Court rejected EPA’s view that it had to
regulate sources emitting GHGs under the PSD program, because a
narrower construction of the term “any air pollutant” was available,
439. Id. at 323-24.
440. UARG, 573 U.S. at 323-24.
441. Id. at 324.
442. Buzbee, supra note 85, at 76.
443. Id. (quoting UARG, 573 U.S. at 324).
444. Lazarus, supra note 78, at 47, citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
120, 159 (2000).
445. Lazarus, supra note 78, at 47; UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
446. Oren, supra note 434, at 58.
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and regulation of GHG sources at the thresholds would, according
to Justice Scalia’s surmise of EPA’s inflated estimations, “caus[e]
construction projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”447  Such an
outcome would contravene one of the Act’s stated purposes for the
PSD program, which is to “insure that economic growth will occur
in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air
resources.”448  As for Chevron step-two, the Court rejected that EPA
could go down this path at its own discretion so long as regulation
at the thresholds would render the programs “unadministrable and
‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ them.”449
XI. ARGUMENT: UARG Actually Preserves EPA Power
Scholars like Professor Buzbee conclude the Court in UARG
“undercut” its previous findings of broad EPA power in Massachu-
setts v. EPA and American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut with regard
to GHG regulation, and they imply UARG would bar any proposed
PSD and Title V regulation of GHG sources in accordance with the
Act’s thresholds.450  This Article, in contrast, argues the UARG hold-
ing actually preserves EPA power with regard to a future GHG
NAAQS.451  Had the Court allowed EPA to “tailor” the CAA, the
Court would have foreclosed the chance of the CAA being enforced
as written and allowed EPA to thereafter pick and choose from the
statute at its leisure, scratch out hard parts, and replace them with
numbers or text that the EPA or some court fancies as more reason-
able.452  This would have not only dealt a “severe blow to the Consti-
tution’s separation of powers” but also severely undermined the
Act’s most powerful protective mandates, which brings us back to
the mandatory duty argument.453
XII. RESURRECTING THE MANDATORY DUTY ARGUMENT
In the event the EPA seeks to establish a Secondary GHG
NAAQS and finds itself defending the regulation before the Su-
447. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014).
448. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2012).
449. UARG, 573 U.S. at 312 (quoting Tailoring Rule, supra note 80, at
31,562).
450. Buzbee, supra note 85, at 63; id. at 69-70 (discussing UARG’s limitation
on EPA authority and declaring majority as “no GHGs-alone PSD authority
majority”).
451. See infra notes 453-454 and accompanying text.
452. UARG, 573 U.S. at 325-26 (forbidding agency from “tailor[ing]” unam-
biguous statutory language to comport with policy goals).
453. Id. at 327.
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preme Court, EPA should resurrect the argument, seldom heard
these days, that it must establish a NAAQS for GHGs under Chevron
step-one, because there now exists a way for the NAAQS program to
work as designed for GHGs and enable economic growth.454  As dis-
cussed, the Court might reject this mandatory duty interpretation
and overturn the Second Circuit’s long-standing Train decision by
finding ambiguity in section 108(a)(1)(C) or some other part.455
But the more that EPA can legitimately argue that it must go down
this path under Chevron step-one, the easier it will be for EPA to
argue that it can go down this path, sua sponte, under Chevron step-
two.456  EPA should also emphasize that, when writing the central
part of the CAA that addresses ambient air pollution across from
numerous and diverse sources, Congress never added a provision
that said disregard if the sources are seemingly too numerous or
diverse, if international emissions contribute to the problem, or if
current rules would make enforcement difficult.457
Of course, EPA would once again be arguing about PSD regu-
lation of GHG sources before the Court that had just recently
warned EPA that “[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-
extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant por-
tion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announce-
ment with a measure of skepticism.”458  But EPA would not be
“discover[ing]” this power as much as finally embracing it.459  Nor
would this power be “unheralded.”460
Ever since the administration of President Bill Clinton, EPA
has recognized the potential for an immense expansion in federal
environmental regulatory authority with regard to the NAAQS pro-
454. See NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (mandating EPA
to list lead as criteria pollutant).
455. Contra id. at 325-27 (finding section 108(a)(1)(C) language
unambiguous).
456. Cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52
(1990) (finding agency’s interpretation reasonable when agency considers practi-
cal implications); Sunstein, supra note 430, at 2104-05 (discussing precise meaning
of “reasonableness” within Chevron analysis).  “Sua Sponte,” taken as “On Their
Own Accord,” is the motto of the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment. See, e.g., Our
Mission, SUA SPONTE FOUNDATION, https://suaspontefoundation.org/our-mission/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
457. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012) (defining “major emitting facility” as a
stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons-per-year or, for certain enu-
merated categories, 100 tpy of “any air pollutant”).
458. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (citation omitted) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson, 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
459. Id.
460. Id.
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visions and GHGs.461  Justice Scalia himself wrote in UARG that by
pursuing GHG regulation in response to Massachusetts v. EPA, “EPA
embarked on a course of regulation resulting in ’the single largest
expansion in the scope of the [Act] in its history.’”462  If that is true,
then the full implications of this expansion have not yet manifested
themselves.  The dust from litigation over GHG regulation by the
Obama EPA has mostly settled, and the current scope of GHG regu-
lation under the CAA still does not go beyond the types of sources
that were already being regulated before Massachusetts v. EPA.463
The boundary of EPA’s new authority under this expansion
and its full regulatory implications remain unknown, because EPA’s
full power to regulate GHGs under the CAA, through a NAAQS,
has never been tested or directly claimed.464  As noted, Bush 43
EPA staff recognized that a long-range Secondary GHG NAAQS
pathway—as a comprehensive strategy to enforce the law to protect
public welfare against the dangers of climate change—might be fea-
sible; but every EPA Administrator since the Clinton administration
has chosen not to use the NAAQS Program or given any indication
that he or she has seriously considered the matter.
If the EPA Administrator were to list GHGs as a criteria air pol-
lutant and take the path advocated by this paper, however, the full
implications of the “largest expansion in the scope of the [Act] in
its history” would finally manifest themselves.465  In sum, when de-
fending a Secondary GHG NAAQS before the Court, the attorneys
for EPA should argue that the Agency is not finding some “ele-
phant[ ] in [a] mouse hole,” but rather, finally acknowledging the
800-pound Gorilla in the room that it has been ignoring for over a
461. See U.S. EPA, EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric
Power Generation Sources, Memorandum from Jonathan Cannon, EPA Gen.
Counsel, to Carol Browner, EPA Adm’r 1 (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter the “Can-
non memo”] (finding that CO2 was covered by sections 108 and 109 but noting
that EPA was not seeking to establish NAAQS at that time).
462. UARG, 573 U.S. at 310 (quoting CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at xxi).
463. See Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2009-2016, 42 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 262, 270-73 (examining tailoring rule and outcomes of Obama-
era greenhouse-gas regulations).
464. Cf. id. at 238 (acknowledging that “the Obama Administration did not
even try” to regulate GHGs through a NAAQS, while noting that “no one thought
that that [decision] was wrong”).
465. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310 (2014) (quoting CAA HANDBOOK, supra
note 6, at xxi).
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decade.466  The attorneys should then inform the Court that EPA
now intends to put the fellow to work.467
XIII. A LIST OF TO DOS, FOR AFTER THE FIRST SHOT
A. Regarding the Overall Scheme
In conclusion, to establish this overall scheme for success, EPA
would specifically need to:
1. List GHGs as a collective criteria air pollutant under sec-
tion 108 and find that GHG concentrations threaten pub-
lic welfare.468
2. Issue “criteria” showing that GHGs are a threat to public
welfare.469  EPA should briefly address the current and fu-
ture public health risks climate change poses but empha-
size that the risks only stem from global CO2eq’s indirect
“effects on . . . weather . . . and climate.”470
3. After a notice-and-comment period and an unprecedented
national conversation on what citizens value regarding cli-
mate change and the world we leave future generations,
establish a Secondary GHG NAAQS of 350 ppm by 2351 or
one based on an updated RPC 3PD that marries the 350
ppm target with the <2°C goal.471  Perhaps EPA could be
less ambitious (see, for example, RCP 4.5472), but then the
regulation could be open to attack for not adequately pro-
tecting public welfare and for failing to achieve the ulti-
mate purpose of the CAA.473  Alternatively, EPA could try
466. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). See Cannon
memo, supra note 462, at 1; ANPR, supra note 140, at 44,481-82.
467. See infra Part XIII.
468. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) (stating EPA can or should list
air pollutants that pose threat to “public health or welfare” and whose presence in
the ambient air derives from numerous or diverse sources).
469. See id. § 7408(a)(2) (stating EPA should issue criteria “reflect[ing] the
latest scientific knowledge” on the pollutants’ “effects on public health or welfare”
within twelve months of a listing).
470. Id. § 7602(h).
471. See id. § 7409(a)(2) (ordering EPA to create primary and secondary air
quality standards for criteria air pollutants). See also supra note 356 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the “39-61%” probability of RCP subcategory titled “Ex-
ceedance of 530 ppm CO2 eq” achieving <2°C goal and long-term global CO2
trajectory of RCP 3PD).
472. See IPCC, 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT AR5, supra note 15, at 21 fig.
SPM.11(a) (showing the slightly less ambitious but still bold trajectory of RCP 4.5
in “GHG emission pathways, 2000-2100: All AR5 scenarios”).
473. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (stating agency’s interpretation
of statute cannot be contrary to statute); see also Copenhagen Accord, supra note
250, at 22 (stating that the “ultimate objective” of the <2°C goal is to “prevent
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to be more ambitious,474 but considering the aforemen-
tioned political, economic, and scientific realities, I believe
this would be “going a bridge too far.”475
4. Promulgate a rule stating that, for purposes of SIP ap-
proval, states need only to develop plans that would attain
the Secondary GHG NAAQS by the deadline but for inter-
national emissions, meaning every state must do it part.476
This would be a simple clarification of section 179B.477
5. Implement a rule or guidance document deeming that all
regions have a status of unclassifiable because, first and
foremost, EPA does not know what the future holds.478
6. Enact a rule that provides a simple and secure framework
wherein states can trade emissions credits, because differ-
ences among individual states would not matter so long as
the U.S. meets decadal reduction-milestones as a whole.479
B. Regarding the Thresholds and Permitting Regulations
As for charting a path that rebuts the assumption but not the
principle, espoused in dictum, by a majority of the Court in UARG
regarding “implementation burdens” and Congressional intent,
EPA would need to promulgate new rules that:
1. Redefine the term “potential” in “potential to emit,” so
that it is closer to a source’s actual emissions; and give own-
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”); see also Ala.
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 360-61, 360 n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (recognizing
limitation on EPA’s authority to enforce CAA in ways that lead to “futile results”).
474. See Piers Forster et al., supra note 323, at 2A-28 Tbl. 2.SM.12, supplement-
ing IPCC, 2018: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, supra note 76, at 99 (paragraph 2.1.3).
475. Cornelius Ryna, A BRIDGE TOO FAR 67 (1974) (quoting Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery’s assessment of Operation Market Garden, a daring but
failed Allied airborne operation into the Nazi-occupied Netherlands to seize
bridges and enable an advance into northern Germany in World War II).
476. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(a) (2012) (requiring EPA to approve implementa-
tion plan if plan shows attainment would be achieved by deadline “but for emis-
sions emanating from outside the United States”).
477. See id.
478. See id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii) (instructing governors to classify area as un-
classifiable if there is insufficient available information to create suitable
classification).
479. See id. § 7410(a)(2) (allowing states to trade and sell emission rights);
supra notes 378-380 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of CCS and
BECCS maybe removing large quantities of CO2 from the atmosphere in the fu-
ture).  EPA could even give some flexibility to a state getting behind if that state
makes up for the emissions in subsequent decades, so that the ultimate heat-forc-
ing effect of its emissions is still on par with the RCP 3PD or an updated version.
See Meinshausen et al., supra note 277, at 233 fig. 6 (showing the projected radia-
tive forcing effects of RCP 3PD/2.6 and RCP8.5 out to 2300).
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ers and operators of non-anyway sources the benefit of the
doubt on estimating potential emissions.480
2. Emphasize the term “modification” in the context of PSD
only comprises major modifications that would signifi-
cantly increase a source’s GHG emissions; and give owners
and operators as much deference as possible.481
3. Enable applicants of non-anyway sources to quickly obtain
a PSD permit by effectively signing an application with a
checked box that says “our facility is implementing the
‘Best Available Control Technology’ that we can afford to
reduce emissions” and perhaps filling in a short paragraph
on what that BACT entails. Again, regulators would give
applicants the benefit of the doubt.482
4. Enable regulators to quickly determine, through other pre-
checked boxes and pro forma means, that the ”system of
continuous emissions reduction” requirement has been
met and that a source’s GHG emissions will not cause
nonattainment or some other CAA violation elsewhere.483
The BACT process itself should enable the former, and the
no-localized-effect nature of CO2 and CH4 should enable
the latter.484
5. Enable the use of remote technology in administrative
public hearings, so that applicants do not have to drive far
or wait in long lines.485  Nothing should prevent attorneys
and administrative law judges from appearing on live-
480. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(1), 7602(j) (regulating facilities with “potential” to
emit 250 or 100 tpy of “any air pollutant” but lacking definition of “potential”).
481. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(2)(C), 7411(a)(4) (defining “modification” under
CAA); Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding
EPA has authority to issue certain categorical exemptions “where the burdens of
regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value” and instructing EPA and courts to
look to CAA’s purpose, rather than plain meaning of its text, when literal applica-
tion of text would “lead to absurd or futile results”). Cf. NRDC v. Adm’r, EPA, 902
F.2d 962, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (denying EPA this discretion where Act prescribes
precise numerical threshold).
482. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (requiring that “best available control technol-
ogy” be determined “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environ-
mental, and economic impacts and other costs”).
483. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(n)(1)(iii). See id. §§ 7475(a)(3), 7479(3) (requiring
proposed permits to not violate existing air-quality standards and requiring “best
available control technology” to not violate emissions standards).
484. See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text (explaining the non-lo-
calized-effects nature of CO2).
485. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(2), 7661a(b)(6) (requiring public hearing and
possibly enabling quick procedures to approve applications).
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screens at hearings and quickly moving through applica-
tions and issuing permits.486
EPA would also need to promulgate rules or, in certain in-
stances, guidance documents that drastically reduce the amount of
litigation that could ensue by:
6. Adopting the position that, because common GHGs do not
have “localized effects,” the complicated cross-state air pol-
lution analyses can be effectively bypassed with pre-
checked boxes and other pro forma means.487
7. Adopting the position that, in the same vein as above, no
individual source could ever suffer a particularized injury
from another source’s CO2 or CH4 emissions that could
be redressable by a court; and therefore only a state should
receive Article III standing to contest the issuance of a PSD
or Title V permit to a non-anyway source of CO2 and
CH4.488
EPA would also need to promulgate guidance documents and
encourage state environmental agencies to do all of the above
through their own rulemaking.489  Generally speaking, EPA should
not rely on states to come up with their own rules.  Rather, EPA
should set up model rules that would meet the minimum require-
ments of the CAA and provide uniformity, especially regarding the
BACT analysis for non-anyway sources, with the model rules mirror-
ing the rules that EPA would enforce through a FIP.490  This should
further lessen the ensuing regulatory burden on businesses.491
No state should subject an owner or operator of a non-anyway
source to a burdensome and time-consuming application process
that consumes a state agency’s resources, because doing so would
threaten the entire scheme.492  Nor would such burdensome regu-
486. See id. at § 7661a(b)(6) (promoting use of expeditious procedures in ap-
plication process).
487. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (describing general procedures in adopting and ap-
proving state implementation plans).
488. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (holding Massachu-
setts has standing to challenge greenhouse gas regulation).
489. Connor N. Raso, Comment, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of
Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 788-89 (2010) (examining usage of gui-
dance documents in administration and comparing them to legislative rules).
490. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 239-44 (2000) (discussing advantages of
environmental law centralization, including compliance with only one standard).
491. See id. at 242-43 (discussing auto manufacturers’ preference to one fed-
eral legislation compliance instead of local and state compliance).
492. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 322 (2014) (discussing implications of
EPA’s proposed rule).
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lation be necessary to achieve climate goals for the foreseeable fu-
ture, because the important reductions would mostly come from
the SIPs.  Again, just as the States are in many respects
“laborator[ies]” of democracy, so too would they be laboratories of
emissions reduction with regard to the SIPs.493  EPA should be pre-
pared to “FIP” many states and cut off highway funding when Con-
gresspersons or Senators from recalcitrant states attempt to cut off
EPA funding.494
As for international market mechanisms, EPA should be wary
of rushing into any system that purports to offer carbon credits on
an international basis.495  As we move through the Century and im-
plementation challenges increase, however, EPA should explore a
trust-but-verify system of international emissions trading, perhaps
aided by a fleet of satellites like NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observa-
tory.  For example, Texas could purchase fifty-year leases of hect-
ares in Ethiopia to grow forests where there currently are none—a
literal carbon offset that would enable Texans to emit more.496
Also, regarding the international front, if other countries were
to agree to reduce emissions in kind and join the U.S. by doing
their part to achieve RCP 3PD or an updated-RCP 3PD and formal-
ize the agreement, the U.S. would be able to hold these foreign
countries accountable in their courts in certain instances and vice
versa under section 115.497  The potential use of market mecha-
nisms and section 115 warrants further study.498
In conclusion, a long-range Secondary GHG NAAQS would
likely require a not-insignificant increase in administrative re-
sources, the extremely efficient use of those resources, a policy of
extreme deference and courtesy toward the owners and operators
493. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).  For a discussion of the role SIPs would play in limiting global warm-
ing, see supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
494. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (allowing EPA to remove highway funding for
lack of compliance).
495. See id. § 7410(a)(2) (permitting use of economic incentives in state im-
plementation plans).
496. See Sharif Paget & Helen Regan, Ethiopia Plants More Than 350 Million
Trees in 12 Hours, CNN (July 30, 2019), http://www.cnn.com/2019/07/29/africa/
ethiopia-plants-350-million-trees-intl-hnk/index.html (discussing instance of mass
tree planting in Ethiopia).
497. See id. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (detailing EPA’s role in combating international
air pollution).
498. See Hannah Chang, Cap and Trade Under the Clean Air Act? Rethinking
§115, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10894, 10903-04 (2010) (discussing ad-
vantages of using SIPs in enforcing CAA § 115 through use of market
mechanisms).
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of newly regulated sources, market mechanisms, the strict enforce-
ment of the provisions that comprise the actual NAAQS and SIPs/
FIPs, and bold but deliberate legal navigation.499  With the leader-
ship of a committed President and dynamic EPA Administrator, it
could be done.
XIV. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY: WITHOUT BLUFFING, ESTABLISH A
SECONDARY GHG NAAQS TO LEVERAGE THE PASSAGE OF AN
AMBITIOUS CARBON PRICE
Finally, and alternatively, a long-range Secondary GHG
NAAQS could be used as a stick; one that, if wielded by a deter-
mined President, could get Congress to do what it is currently un-
willing to do—and what many environmentalists and economists
have for years been unsuccessfully clamoring for—which is pass a
bold, steadily increasing revenue-neutral price on carbon emis-
sions.500  In other words, by using existing law to legitimately shove
grand-scale, cap-and-trade climate regulation down the throats of
states and subjecting millions of business to major-source permit-
ting regulations, a President might actually put normally recalci-
trant Republicans and reluctant Democrats in Congress in the
mood for passing legislation that is perhaps less painful, more cost-
effective, and friendlier to free enterprise than a Secondary GHG
NAAQS.  Such legislation could be a steadily increasing and eventu-
ally quite high tax on GHG emissions, with practically all of the
proceeds going back to American households to offset the expected
increase in the price of energy and goods.501  If carbon price advo-
cates implemented this particular strategy, then, by going to war
with the army we have, they might be able to get the army they want
for this long struggle.
Such a ploy of regulatory brinksmanship, however, could only
work if it is not a bluff.  Whoever sits in the Oval Office would have
to be willing to veto any reactionary bill that attempts to prohibit
the NAAQS regulation of GHGs or replace it with something
499. See supra Parts III-VI, IX, and XII and notes 469-499 and accompanying
text.
500. See Jason Bordoff & Michael Lewis, Bittersweet Achievement on Climate, N.Y.
TIMES A25 (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/opinion/bitter
sweet-achievement-on-climate.html (discussing failure of Congress to enact mean-
ingful legislation to combat climate change).
501. See supra note 414 and accompanying text exploring H.R. 763, 116th
Cong. (2019) (titled the “Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2019”)
and S. 3791, 115th Cong. (2018) (titled the “Energy Innovation and Carbon Divi-
dend Act of 2018”).
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weaker.502  The President would also need to prevent Congress
from overriding his or her veto and order EPA to press forward with
the NAAQS process for GHGs until Congress finally submits and
passes legislation equal to the task of mitigating climate change.
The stakes would be high.503  Congress could create a huge setback
by passing new law that either prohibits a GHG NAAQS or all GHG
regulation under the CAA.504  Accordingly, this paper discourages
any state or entity from petitioning EPA or attempting to force its
hand through litigation on this matter during the Trump adminis-
tration or when Republicans control Congress.505  The Attorneys
General of progressive states should prepare for this long legal bat-
tle, but they should plan discreetly.506  After all, it is best to catch
one’s adversary in an ambush, which requires surprise and good
timing.507
XV. CONCLUSION
Thinking ahead to when a President committed to serious ac-
tion on climate change takes office and Congress is either con-
trolled by Democrats or at least divided, one quote from a very
stable genius, our current President, does come to mind: “[w]hat
the hell do you have to lose?”508
502. See Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, S. 482, 112th Cong. (2011-2012)
(proposing to prohibit EPA from regulating GHGs under CAA and to exempt
GHGs from definition of “air pollutant” for purposes of addressing climate
change); Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 910, 112th Cong. (2011-2012)
(proposing same prohibition on GHG regulation under CAA as well as explicit
repeal of, among other regulations, EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding on
GHGs).
503. See Meinshausen et al., supra note 59, at 233 fig. 6 (extrapolating data to
determine warming that occurs without action); see also supra note 503.
504. See supra note 503.
505. See Anthony Leiserowitz et al., supra note 417, at 4 (noting great divide
on global warming between Republicans and Democrats).
506. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (holding Massachu-
setts has standing to challenge lack of greenhouse gas regulations).
507. See RANGER HANDBOOK, supra note 126, at 7-10; see also SUN-TZU, THE ART
OF WAR 208 (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., Westview Press 1994) (stating “[i]f the birds
take flight, there is an ambush. If the animals are afraid, enemy forces are mount-
ing a sudden attack.”).
508. Donald J. Trump, Speech at the Waukesha County Expo Center, Wauke-
sha, WI (Sept. 28, 2016).
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